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I. INTRODUCTION
HE so-called "deferral privilege" is one of the fundamental fea-
tures of the U.S. system for taxing international income. Under
that privilege, a U.S. person that conducts business or investment
activity abroad through a foreign corporation generally does not pay U.S.
tax on the foreign source earnings of the foreign corporation until those
earnings are distributed to the U.S. person or the U.S. person sells the
foreign corporation's stock.t When the foreign country involved is one
that imposes only low rates of tax, this privilege allows U.S. taxpayers to
defer substantial amounts of U.S. tax at the cost of only a small foreign
levy. Hence, the deferral privilege operates as a tax "subsidy" of sorts for
U.S. persons with operations in low tax foreign countries and provides a
major incentive for U.S. persons to shift their business operations and
investments to foreign countries that impose little or no tax on the earn-
ings of the foreign corporation.2
To prevent abuse of the deferral privilege, Congress over the years has
enacted a number of so-called "anti-deferral" regimes, which curtail
deferral in certain circumstances but leave the privilege intact in a large
residual area.3 These anti-deferral regimes, including the controlled for-
eign corporation provisions of Subpart F of the Code, 4 are among the
most complicated provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover,
these anti-deferral rules were created in a different era, when manufac-
turing activity dominated the domestic and world economies and interna-
tional trade was a far less significant component of the world economy;
thus, the design of these rules has not kept pace with the changing nature
1. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD
PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 335-36 (1997).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
3. The deferral privilege has been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-
the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, End Deferral]; Asim Bhansali,
Note, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States Multinationals, 74 TEX. L. REv.
1401 (1996); Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and
New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581 (1990); Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of
the American Jobs Act of 1996,72 TAX NOTES 1165 (1996); Robert A. Green, The Future of
Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18
(1993); Joseph lsenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S. Taxation of the Earnings of
Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062 (1988); John McDonald, Comment, Anti-Deferral
Deferred: A Proposal for the Reform of International Tax Law, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
248 (1995); Peter Merrill & Carol Dunahoo, 'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and
Reality, 72 TAX NOTES 221 (1996); Paul W. Oosterhuis & Roseann M. Cutrone, The Cost
of Deferral's Repeal: If Done Properly, It Loses Billions, 58 TAX NoTEs 765 (1993); Ste-
phen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral Rules, 74 TAXES 1042 (1996).
4. I.R.C. §§ 951-964.
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of the global marketplace and international investment structures. The
anachronistic nature of Subpart F and the other anti-deferral rules in the
Code has spawned increasing numbers of intricate planning strategies to
avoid the impact of these rules and preserve the deferral privilege. 5 The
complex, incomplete, and anachronistic nature of these rules has
prompted us to reconsider the appropriate scope of the U.S. anti-deferral
regimes.
This Article discusses and critiques the various methods for curtailing
deferral of U.S. income tax on foreign source income. We conclude that
the most effective way to deal with the deferral issue is to treat a foreign
corporation as a pass-through entity for U.S. income tax purposes with
respect to U.S. persons holding stock in the corporation. Our proposal,
however, provides special rules for less than 10% U.S. shareholders in
non-U.S.-controlled foreign corporations.
The Article begins in Part II with an explanation and theoretical analy-
sis of the deferral incentive. Part III of the Article then traces the legisla-
tive evolution of the anti-deferral provisions of the current U.S. tax law.
Part IV is an overview discussion of anti-deferral regimes employed in
foreign jurisdictions. This discussion provides a comparative benchmark
for designing a revised anti-deferral regime for the U.S. tax system. Part
V is an explanation of why developing a technically sound approach for
ending deferral is an important enterprise, even though the policy contro-
versy concerning the desirability of deferral probably cannot be resolved.
Part VI enunciates the criteria we believe should be used in constructing
a sound regime for curtailing deferral and why we believe that the pass-
through approach is the superior one. Parts VII and VIII examine the
two principal alternative approaches to revising the anti-deferral regimes,
both of which we believe are inferior to our pass-through approach-an
expanded Subpart F regime and the Rostenkowski-Gradison bill (which
was never enacted into law). In Part IX, we present our proposal to treat
foreign corporations as pass-through entities with respect to U.S. persons
holding stock in such entities and explain how enactment of such a propo-
sal could lead to other reforms in the international tax rules of the United
States. Part X focuses on an important and difficult area of any tax re-
form proposal-namely, transition issues. Finally, Part XI provides a
brief summary of our conclusions.
II. DEFERRAL INCENTIVE: HOW DOES IT WORK AND
WHAT IS IT?
This part of the Article will provide an overview and theoretical analy-
sis of the deferral incentive. Current U.S. income tax (subject to the al-
5. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.R.B. 25; David Rosenbloom, International
Tax Arbitrage and The "International Tax System" 39 (October 21, 1998) (unpublished




lowance of a credit for foreign income tax6) is generally paid on income
realized from:
1. U.S. business or investment activities carried on by an individual,
corporation, LLC7 or partnership.8
2. Foreign business or investment activities carried on by a foreign
branch of a U.S. corporation.9
3. Foreign business or investment activities carried on by a U.S. indi-
vidual or by an LLC or partnership composed of U.S. members or
partners.'°
Under the doctrine of Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner," the
U.S. income tax law usually regards a foreign corporation, whether or not
controlled by U.S. persons, as a foreign taxpayer that is legally distinct
from its shareholders.12 This principle applies to any entity (including an
LLC) classified as a foreign corporation for U.S. tax law purposes,
whether under the current "check-the-box" entity classification system 13
or under the prior "corporate resemblance" entity classification regula-
tions.' 4 Thus, except to the extent that the Internal Revenue Code's var-
ious anti-deferral regimes provide otherwise, U.S. tax on foreign source
business and investment income earned by a U.S. person through a for-
eign corporation, even a U.S.-taxpayer-controlled foreign corporation, 15
is generally deferred until the income is repatriated to the United States
through corporate distributions or until the stock is sold. 16 These anti-
deferral regimes have different trigger points (i.e., definition of the entity
covered by the anti-deferral regime, types of income as to which deferral
is curtailed, and types of U.S. shareholders for whom deferral is cur-
6. See I.R.C. § 901(a).
7. In this Article, the abbreviation "LLC" refers to a limited liability company
formed under U.S. law and taxed on a pass-through basis.
8. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a)(2), 61(a)(13), 702, 864(b), 864(c), 871(b), 875(1), 882.
9. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(2).
10. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a)(2), 61(a)(13), 702.
11. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
12. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.11-1(a), 1.881-1; 1 JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAX-
ATION 1:22 (2d ed. 1999).
13. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, -3, (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215).
14. See T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409; T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
15. In this Article, such an entity is hereinafter referred to as a "controlled foreign
corporation" or a "CFC."
16. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 335-41. When the income is
reported by the U.S. shareholder as an actual dividend, as an inclusion under one of the
anti-deferral regimes or as a deemed dividend under Section 1248 on the sale of a CFC's
stock, the U.S. shareholder will obtain an indirect foreign tax credit for a proportionate
amount of the creditable foreign taxes paid or accrued by the foreign corporation (which
are "deemed paid" by the U.S. shareholder at the time of the dividend, income inclusion or
deemed dividend income) if the U.S. shareholder owns at least 10% of the voting stock of
the foreign corporation and is either a U.S. domestic corporation or an individual who
elects under section 962 to be taxed as a corporation with respect to the income. See I.R.C.
§ 902, 960. The amount of the U.S. shareholder's actual dividend, income inclusion or
deemed dividend will be "grossed up" (i.e., increased) by the amount of the foreign corpo-
ration's foreign taxes deemed paid by the U.S. shareholder. See I.R.C. § 78. The U.S.
shareholder will also receive a direct credit for any foreign tax withheld from an actual
dividend. See I.R.C. § 901.
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tailed) and different anti-deferral mechanisms (i.e., current income inclu-
sion, characterization of the U.S. shareholder's gain from sale of stock in
the entity as ordinary income, or interest charge on the deferred U.S.
income tax at the time that the U.S. shareholder receives a dividend dis-
tribution from the foreign corporation or realizes gain from a sale of the
corporation's stock). They also overlap to some considerable extent;
thus, a U.S. shareholder's ownership interest in a foreign corporation may
be subject to more than one of these anti-deferral regimes at the same
time.17
The Code's anti-deferral regimes, however, constitute a weak barrier to
deferral, particularly with respect to active business income. For exam-
ple, the CFC provisions1 8 are the most comprehensive of these regimes.
When they apply, they impose current U.S. tax on five categories of cur-
rent CFC income, including both active and passive items, that are collec-
tively referred to as Subpart F income.' 9 The tax is implemented by
treating U.S. persons who own at least 10% of the voting power of a
CFC's stock,21 actually or by statutory attribution,2 1 as if each had re-
ceived a dividend of their pro rata shares of the CFC's Subpart F income
for the year.22 In addition, these same persons are also treated as receiv-
ing dividends equal to their pro rata shares of the CFC's earnings and
profits that have not been previously or currently taxed to them as Sub-
part F income and that are invested in certain U.S. assets during the
year.23 Section 960 adds that U.S. persons who are charged with receipt
of either of these constructive dividends are also entitled to an indirect
credit for foreign income tax liabilities allocable thereto, if the U.S. per-
sons actually own at least 10% of the CFC's voting stock and if the U.S.
persons are either domestic corporations or individuals who have elected
under section 962 to be taxed as domestic corporations. 24
The preceding CFC regime, however, applies only if more than 50% of
the voting power or value of the CFC's shares 25 is owned by U.S. persons
who each own at least 10% of the voting power of the CFC's stock.26
17. The Code contains various rules for coordinating the application of these regimes
in the light of their overlapping scope. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 551(g), 951(c), (d), (f),
1293(g)(1)(A), 1297(d), (e).
18. I.R.C. §§ 951-964, 1248. For a detailed discussion of the Subpart F provisions, see
I JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. B3 (1992).
19. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(1)(A)(i), 952. Although Subpart F income is usually foreign
source, see I.R.C. § 952(b), it is theoretically possible for U.S. source passive income that
has been subjected to U.S. withholding tax to, nevertheless, be included in Subpart F in-
come, see I.R.C. §§ 952(b), 954(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.952-1(b)(2).
20. See I.R.C. § 951(a)(1), (b).
21. See I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 958(a), (b).
22. See I.R.C. § 951(a)(l)(A)(i), (a)(2).
23. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(1)(B), 956,959; Treas. Reg. § 1.959-1(c) Ex.; Melvin S. Adess,
Barbara M. Angus & Keith E. Villmow, The Erosion of Deferral: Subpart F After the 1993
Act, 47 TAX LAW. 933, 954 (1994).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 960(a)(1), 962(a); see also I.R.C. § 902.
25. See I.R.C. § 957(a). The 50% threshold is lowered to 25% for certain foreign in-
surance companies by sections 953(c) and 957(b).
26. See I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957(a).
[Vol. 52
CURTAILING DEFERRAL
Moreover, constructive dividends of Subpart F income and amounts in-
vested in U.S. assets are imputed only to those U.S. shareholders who
own, actually or by statutory attribution, at least 10% of the CFC's stock
voting power. 27 This means that the CFC provisions are avoidable to the
extent that U.S. persons keep their ownership of a CFC's stock from ex-
ceeding 50% of the voting power or value of the outstanding shares or to
the extent that each U.S. shareholder restricts his, her, or its stock owner-
ship to shares possessing less than 10% of voting power.28 Furthermore,
Subpart F income excludes manufacturing income. 29 Thus, a CFC is ef-
fectively outside the Subpart F constructive dividend provisions to the
extent that its income is earned through selling goods of its own manufac-
ture. By carefully observing the stock ownership rules described above 30
or by ensuring that a CFC has only manufacturing income and that it
avoids investments in U.S. assets, U.S. shareholders of a CFC can, and
do, readily avoid current U.S. tax on the CFC's income. 31
Section 1248 is often mentioned as included in the Code's CFC provi-
sions. Generally speaking, section 1248 employs a complex set of rules to
convert gain recognized on disposition of CFC stock from capital gain to
dividend income. 32 Nevertheless, it is largely ineffectual as an anti-defer-
ral device because it does not affect deferral's time-value-of-money bene-
fit illustrated below. 33
27. See I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
28. For an example of a corporate inversion transaction designed to avoid the Subpart
F rules, see the Helen of Troy corporate expatriation transaction, discussed infra note 78.
The IRS responded to these corporate inversion transactions by issuing the anti-inversion
rules in I.R.S. Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356, and Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) (as amended
by T.D. 8702, 1997-1 C.B. 92). For a more recent corporate inversion transaction, see the
Tyco corporate expatriation by merger into ADP.
29. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4); Interview with Daniel M. Berman, 76 TAX NOTES
1387, 1389-90 (1997); N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Notice 98-11: Tax Treatment of Hybrid
Entities, 79 TAX NOTES 877, 882 (1998); David R. Tillinghast, An Old-Timer's Comment on
Notice 98-11, 78 Tax Notes 1739 (1998).
30. However, one must caveat the indirect stock ownership rules in section 958(a) and
the constructive stock ownership rules in section 958(b).
31. See Adess, Angus & Villmow, supra note 23, at 935; Mike Cooper, Gary Melcher
& Clint Stretch, Suddenly Saving Foreign Taxes is Abusive? An Untenable Proposal, 79
TAX NOTES 885, 886 (1998); 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 12, at 1:22-1:23.
32. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 410-11; 2 KUNTZ & PERON],
supra note 18, at I B6.03[6].
33. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54. Moreover, section 1248's "deemed divi-
dend" treatment of all or a part of a U.S. shareholder's gain from the sale of a CFC's stock
actually provides a tax benefit to a U.S. corporate shareholder of the CFC that owns at
least 10% of the CFC's voting stock, because the deemed dividend will carry an indirect
foreign tax credit under section 902 for a proportionate amount of the CFC's foreign taxes
"deemed paid" by the U.S. corporate shareholder on account of the deemed dividend. In
addition, realization of dividend income under section 1248 on the sale or liquidation of a
CFC's stock often has the advantage of avoiding the foreign withholding tax imposed on
actual dividends because gain on a sale of stock or liquidation of a corporation often is
exempt from a foreign country's withholding tax. Thus, a corporate shareholder often pre-
fers dividend treatment under section 1248 to sale treatment, particularly in the absence of
a capital gain preference for corporate taxpayers under current law, see GUSTAFSON, PER-
ONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 410-11, as well as possible U.S. source treatment of most
gain, see I.R.C. § 865(a); but see I.R.C. § 865(f), (h)(10).
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The foreign personal holding company (FPHC) provisions 34 are a sec-
ond anti-deferral regime. They tax U.S. persons who are shareholders of
an FPHC as if they had received current pro rata distributions of the
company's undistributed foreign personal holding company income for
the year.35 However, a foreign corporation is not an FPHC unless ini-
tially 60% or more of its annual gross income is comprised of certain
types of passive and personal service income. 36 This benchmark gener-
ally drops to 50% for years after the first year of qualification as an
FPHC.37 Thus, the FPHC provisions are generally avoided if the foreign
corporation has predominantly active business income. Moreover, these
provisions require that at some time during the tax year, more than 50%
of the voting power or value of the foreign corporation's stock must have
been owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer individuals who were
U.S. citizens or residents. 38 This stock ownership requirement provides
an easy path to avoidance of the FPHC provisions. 39
Yet another anti-deferral regime is found in the foreign investment
company provisions.40 If they apply, a U.S. shareholder who disposes of
stock must treat any gain as ordinary to the extent of the shareholder's
pro rata share of the foreign corporation's earnings and profits accumu-
lated after 1962.41 Like section 1248, these provisions are a rather feeble
attack on deferral because they only deal with the character of gain and
not the time-value-of money advantage derived from deferral.42 Further-
more, they require that the foreign corporation be registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as either a management company or a
34. See I.R.C. §§ 551-558. For a detailed discussion of the FPHC provisions, see 1
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 18, at B2.06.
35. See I.R.C. § 551(b). Undistributed foreign personal holding company income is
the taxable income of the FPHC subject to certain adjustments. See I.R.C. § 556(a). A
U.S. shareholder increases its tax basis in the shares by the amount of the deemed divi-
dend. See I.R.C. § 551(e).
36. See I.R.C. §§ 552(a)(1), 553(a).
37. See I.R.C. § 552(a)(1).
38. See I.R.C. § 552(a)(2).
39. In some circumstances, however, the FPHC provisions can have a surprisingly
broad reach. For example, there are broad partner-to-partner attribution rules for pur-
poses of the stock ownership requirement. Under these rules, an individual is considered
to own the stock owned by his or her partners, even if the partner is a foreign person
(provided that the U.S. individual otherwise owns, actually or constructively, some stock in
the foreign corporation). See I.R.C. § 554(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (c)(2). Thus, if an invest-
ment partnership acquires control of a foreign corporation, the stock ownership require-
ment is met if any one of its partners is a U.S. individual, no matter how small the
individual's partnership interest. The related person-dividend look-through rule in section
552(c) is very restricted in that it cross-references the same-country-related-person divi-
dend exception in section 954(a)(1), (a)(5), and (c)(3) (requiring that the dividend be from
a corporation organized in and with substantially all of its assets used in an active business
in the same country). Accordingly, many foreign holding companies controlled by invest-
ment partnerships meet both the FPHC gross income and stock ownership tests and are
FPHCs.
40. See I.R.C. §§ 1246-1247. For a detailed discussion of the foreign investment com-
pany provisions, see I KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 18, at 9l B2.07.
41. See I.R.C. § 1246(a).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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unit investment trust or that it be primarily engaged in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities or commodities. 43 Corpora-
tions predominantly engaged in active commercial operations outside the
securities or commodities business are not covered. Finally, the foreign
investment company provisions are inapplicable unless at least 50% of
the vote or value of the foreign corporation's stock is owned by U.S. per-
sons.44 This provides a ready escape from the foreign investment com-
pany provisions.45
A final anti-deferral regime is found in the passive foreign investment
company (PFIC) provisions.46 Generally speaking, this regime attacks
deferral through a complex offsetting interest charge mechanism applied
at the shareholder level.47 It is quite broad in coverage in two important
respects-its anti-deferral mechanism applies to any U.S. person owning
stock in a foreign corporation that meets the definition of a PFIC, no
matter how small that shareholder's ownership interest in the corpora-
tion, and the definition of a PFIC does not depend on any degree of
concentrated ownership by U.S. persons of stock in the corporation. The
PFIC regime, however, is inapplicable to foreign corporations predomi-
nantly engaged in active business operations because it applies only if a
corporation's annual gross income is at least 75% passive or at least 50%
of the average of the corporation's assets held during the year produced
passive income or were held for the production of passive income.48
Moreover, a foreign corporation that meets the definitions of both a CFC
and a PFIC is not treated as a PFIC with respect to a U.S. person owning
43. See I.R.C. § 1246(b)(2).
44. See 1.R.C. § 1246(b).
45. See 2 ISENBERGH, supra note 12, at 43:3. Offshore funds generally are sold to U.S.
institutional investors (not U.S. individuals) and foreign persons. These funds typically try
to avoid registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940. So-called master-feeder
structures (either partnerships or business trusts formed under Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, or Delaware law that are taxable as partnerships) have been popular in recent years
and may have a regulated investment company as a domestic feeder fund and an offshore
investment fund as a foreign feeder fund. The foreign investment company provisions are
rarely a serious issue under this structure.
46. See I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297; see generally Thomas D. Fuller, The Pfickle Finger of Fate:
Many Questions, Few Answers, 81 TAX NOTES 879 (1998). For a detailed discussion of the
PFIC provisions, see 1 KUNTz & PERONI, supra note 18, at $ B2.08.
47. See I.R.C. § 1291(a); see also GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 429-
30. There are also elective alternatives in the form of a pass-through regime for a qualified
electing fund (QEF), see I.R.C. § 1293, and a mark-to-market regime, see I.R.C. § 1296.
48. See I.R.C. § 1297(a). The PFIC rules are a frequent issue in U.S.-managed off-
shore portfolio or direct investment fund structures. There often are one or more U.S.
individuals serving as partners in a general partnership that holds a 20% carried interest in
the fund. These individuals benefit from capital gain treatment and therefore want to be
able to make a QEF election so that the character of the fund's capital gains flows through
to the U.S. individual investors. Tax-exempt partners generally are indifferent after tempo-
rary regulations promulgated in 1998. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-IT(e) (1998). Non-
U.S. managed funds are reluctant to commit to provide the fund-level information neces-
sary to make a QEF election, but will do so if they are marketing the fund to U.S. individ-
ual investors eligible for a preferential tax rate on capital gains. Obtaining entity-level
information is a potential problem whenever an anti-deferral regime requires current in-
clusion by a U.S. shareholder of the income of a non-U.S.-controlled foreign corporation
and is exacerbated when the shareholder owns only a small interest in the corporation.
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stock in the corporation who meets the definition of a 10% or more
"United States shareholder" in section 951(b), thus eliminating this over-
lap between the CFC and PFIC regimes and weakening the strength of
the PFIC regime as an anti-deferral mechanism. 49
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the Internal Revenue
Code's anti-deferral provisions can be readily circumvented by making
certain that the CFC has substantial active business income or that its
U.S. ownership is kept below applicable thresholds. In short, the anti-
deferral regimes are substantially avoidable barriers to achieving deferral
of U.S. tax on foreign business and investment income of foreign corpora-
tions controlled by U.S. shareholders. 511
This deferral of U.S. tax on foreign source income of a foreign corpora-
tion controlled by U.S. taxpayers provides an incentive for U.S. taxpayers
to carry on business and hold investments in low-tax countries through
CFCs.51 The following example is one approach to demonstrating the
operation of this incentive:
Assume that U.S. Corp., taxed under section 11 at 35%, earns
$100 of taxable income from branch operations in a foreign country
which imposes a 10% income tax but no branch profits tax or divi-
49. See I.R.C. § 1297(e) (1998) (added by Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1175, 111 Stat. 788,
990-93 (1997)).
50. See generally GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 355-41; STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, at 1021-22 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF THE 1986
AcT].
51. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: AN INTERIM REPORT 7
(Jan. 1993) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP.]. In overall terms, the deferral
subsidy may be quite large. To be specific, the tax expenditures chapter of the Clinton
Administration's 1999 fiscal year budget estimated that the fiscal 1999 revenue loss from
deferral would be $2.6 billion, and that, as a result, deferral would rank as the 29th largest
of 115 fiscal 1999 tax expenditures. See Tax Expenditures Chapter from the President's
Fiscal 1999 Budget, 78 TAX NOTES 911, 912, 925-27 (1998). Some commentators have dis-
puted this, however. They have argued that if deferral were eliminated, CFC losses would
become deductible by U.S. shareholders and, in addition, the excess foreign tax credits of
many U.S. corporations would become usable against current U.S. tax on CFC income.
They assert that as a result of these two developments, little revenue would be gained from
ending deferral. See Frisch, supra note 3, at 585-86; LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, The Future
of Deferral, in TAXING AMERICA 239 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996);
Oosterhuis & Cutrone, supra note 3, at 767-68; Shay, supra note 3, at 1061; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra, at 10; see also Kathleen Matthews, How Should Clinton Han-
dle International Tax Issues?, 57 TAX NOTES 985, 986 (1992); Roundtable Discus-
sion-International Taxation: D. Kevin Dolan, Stephen E. Shay, and David R. Tillinghast,
ABA Sec. of Tax'n Newsletter, Fall 1993, at 8. Under this view, the preceding revenue loss
estimate may be substantially overstated. Nevertheless, any restriction on the ability elec-
tively to defer income or take losses into account currently may be presumed to raise reve-
nue. But regardless of how this empirical question is resolved, the deferral privilege clearly
encourages U.S. taxpayers to carry on business operations through CFCs in low-tax foreign
countries if the taxpayers anticipate that they will not be in an excess foreign tax credit
status indefinitely and that the foreign operations will be profitable. Thus, those who are
primarily concerned with capital export neutrality (defined infra note 59) will favor ending
deferral regardless of whether the revenue consequence to the Treasury is a large gain, a
small gain or a loss. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, More on U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of
Subpart F, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 1943 (1998); Shay, supra note 3, at 1061, 1063.
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dend withholding tax.52 U.S. Corp. would currently incur a net 25%
U.S. tax (35% U.S. tax less a section 901 direct foreign tax credit for
the 10% foreign tax).
But if U.S. Corp. carries on its foreign operations through a wholly
owned foreign subsidiary, and if the anti-deferral provisions are in-
applicable, the 25% net U.S. tax (35% U.S. tax minus a section 902
indirect foreign tax credit) on the subsidiary's $100 of taxable income
is deferred until the subsidiary's income (grossed up under section
78) is distributed to U.S. Corp. or until U.S. Corp. sells the subsidi-
ary's stock. During the deferral period, U.S. Corp has the interest-
free use of the $25 of deferred tax and is, therefore, commonly de-
scribed as the beneficiary of a $25 interest-free loan from the U.S.
Treasury.53 The following table shows two ways of illustrating the
value of this benefit:54
Table 1
U.S. Corp.'s Total Avoided U.S. Corp.'s Year 1
Interest Expense on $25 Cost of $25 Deferred Tax
Deferral Period (10% After-Tax Interest Rate) (10% Discount Rate)
5 years $15.26 $15.52
20 years $143.19 $ 3.72
Although the preceding interest-free-loan analysis is the usual method
for illustrating the effect of deferral, it is arguably more accurate to de-
scribe deferral as a system by which U.S. shareholders compel the Treas-
ury to invest in their CFCs. To illustrate this point, assume again that
U.S. Corp., a 35% bracket U.S. taxpayer, is the sole shareholder of a CFC
operating in a foreign country that imposes a 10% income tax but no
dividend withholding tax. The CFC earns $100 of net business profits on
the last day of year one but does not distribute this amount until the end
of year two. If the CFC were a branch or a domestic corporation, the
U.S. Treasury would be entitled to a $25 net tax for year one (35% U.S.
tax minus a section 901 direct credit for the 10% foreign tax). But under
the non-heroic assumption that the U.S. anti-deferral regimes are
avoided, the CFC is free to invest this $25 during year two as part of the
$90 year one revenue that it retains after paying the $10 year one foreign
tax. If the CFC loses half of this $90 and distributes only $45 to U.S.
Corp. at the close of year two, the distribution will be grossed up under
section 78 to $55 ($45 distribution of all remaining earnings + $10 previ-
ously paid foreign tax). A 25% U.S. tax thereon in the amount of $13.75
52. If a branch profits tax or dividend withholding tax were imposed, it would likely
result in a Section 901 direct credit as an "in lieu of" tax under Section 903. Thus, to
simplify this and succeeding examples, we assume that the foreign country does not impose
these taxes.
53. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 337; 1 ISENBERGH, supra note
12, at 1:22.; see also Green, supra note 3, at 34 (1993).
54. See generally JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE STRUCTURE AND POLICY 411-15 (1995).
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(after application of the foreign tax credit) will be paid to the U.S. Treas-
ury. Because of the CFC's year two loss, the Treasury's tax collection has
been cut from $25 to $13.75 (i.e., the Treasury has shared in the CFC's
loss just like an equity investor). The Treasury's tax collection, however,
is $13.75 instead of the $12.50 (one-half of $25) that one would intuitively
expect in view of the fact that one-half of the Treasury's $25 "investment"
was lost during year two. How do we account for the extra $1.25 col-
lected by the Treasury? This is exactly equal to the Treasury's $12.50 year
two loss multiplied by the 10% foreign tax rate. In other words, the
Treasury has effectively realized a $1.25 foreign tax saving just as any
non-governmental equity investor would if it deducted a $12.50 invest-
ment loss from income otherwise taxable at a 10% rate.
Of course, if the CFC doubled its money to $180 during year two (a $90
gain), paid a $9 foreign tax on the gain at the end of year two and then
distributed $171 ($180 - $9) to U.S. Corp., the distribution would be
grossed up to $190 ($171 + $10 + $9) and the U.S. Treasury would collect
a net 25% tax of $47.50 instead of $25 (i.e., the Treasury would take a
share of the CFC's year two profit just like an equity investor). But in
this gain scenario, why is the U.S. tax only $47.50 instead of $50? The
reason is that when the $25 that was the Treasury's share of the CFC's
year one retained profits doubled to $50, thus producing a $25 gain for
the Treasury, the foreign government took 10% ($2.50) of this gain as tax,
just as if the Treasury were a nongovernmental investor. This left the
Treasury with a net gain of $22.50, which, when added to the Treasury's
initial $25 "investment," yielded $47.50-the amount of the Treasury's
year two tax collection. As the preceding gain and loss scenarios both
illustrate, instead of viewing deferral as providing U.S. shareholders with
an interest-free loan, it is arguably better to think of deferral as a means
by which U.S. shareholders force the U.S. Treasury to provide equity cap-
ital for their CFCs.
There is also an alternative approach for analyzing deferral that draws
on an insight commonly used in analyzing consumption tax regimes. This
insight holds that if tax rates remain constant, allowing a deduction for
the cost of an investment but then taxing all returns thereon (including
recovery of basis or principal) is generally equivalent to disallowing a de-
duction for the investment's cost but then excluding all returns thereon
from the tax base. 55 When this insight is applied to CFCs, it teaches that
deferral of tax on a CFC's retained income (which is equivalent to al-
55. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1126, 1150 (1974); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The Decep-
tively Disparate Treatment of Business and Investment Interest Expense Under a Cash-Flow
Consumption Tax and a Schanz-Haig-Simons Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 544, 552-54
(1997); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 123 (1977). How-
ever, for a discussion of the conditions that must exist for these equivalent results to occur,
see ABA Sec. of Tax'n Comm. on Simplification, Complexity and the Personal Consump-
tion Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415, 418, 425 (1982); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1601-02 (1979); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Acceler-
ated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 551-52 (1985); Alvin C.
[Vol. 52
CURTAILING DEFERRAL
lowing a present deduction for the cost of investments made by the CFC
out of that income) effectively treats the CFC as if a current U.S. tax were
paid on the retained income but the CFC were then allowed a U.S. tax
exemption for all returns from investing its after-tax retained income.
To demonstrate this proposition, assume, as above, that U.S. Corp., a
35% bracket U.S. taxpayer, has a wholly owned CFC which earns $100 of
net income from operations in a foreign country imposing a 10% income
tax and no dividend withholding tax and that none of the U.S. anti-defer-
ral provisions apply. All of the CFC's year one earnings occur at year-
end and are distributed by the CFC to U.S. Corp. at the close of year two.
During the twelve-month deferral period, the CFC invests its $90 of re-
tained earnings (after payment of the $10 foreign tax) at a 10% per an-
num pre-tax rate of return. The investment earns $9 ($90 x .10) and at
the close of year two, the CFC pays a $0.90 foreign tax thereon and dis-
tributes $98.10 ($90 +$9 - $0.90) to U.S. Corp. This amount is grossed up
to $109 under section 78 ($98.10 + $10 + $0.90), a 25% U.S. tax in the
amount of $27.25 is paid thereon after credit for the foreign tax ($109 x
.25 = $27.25) and U.S. Corp. has $70.85 left ($98.10 distribution - $27.25
U.S. tax).
Now assume a radically different U.S. tax regime in which there is no
deferral of the 35% U.S. tax on the CFC's business profits but there is
also no U.S. tax on earnings produced by the CFC's investment of those
profits, not even when the earnings are distributed to U.S. Corp. as divi-
dends. Under this regime, the CFC's $100 of business profits will bear a
full 35% combined U.S. and foreign tax at the end of year one (10%
foreign tax plus 25% U.S. tax after crediting the foreign tax). The CFC
will then have only $65 to invest at 10% during year two. The CFC will
earn $6.50 on this amount, pay a 10% foreign tax of $0.65, pay no U.S. tax
and have $70.85 left for distribution to U.S. Corp. at the end of year two
($65 principal + $6.50 earnings - $0.65 foreign tax). Under the parame-
ters of our assumed tax regime, no U.S. tax will be due on the distribution
and U.S. Corp. will wind up with $70.85. This is exactly the same as U.S.
Corp's ending amount when we assumed above that the applicable U.S.
taxing regime deferred U.S. tax on the CFC's income until it was repatri-
ated, but then taxed both the business profits and the investment earnings
thereon. In other words, the existing U.S. deferral regime reaches the
same result as the hypothetical regime under which the CFC's retained
business profits are currently taxed, but there is never a U.S. tax on the
CFC's earnings from investing those profits.
Thus, if U.S. tax on CFC income is deferred until the income is distrib-
uted to U.S. shareholders, the CFC is effectively permitted to receive a
return on investments of those earnings during the deferral period that is
free of U.S. tax forever. This means that deferral creates an exemption
Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a
Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. I (1996).
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regime for the investment return on a CFC's retained earnings.56 It also
means that with respect to a CFC's retained earnings, deferral allows the
CFC to function for its U.S. shareholders as if it were a section 103 tax
exempt bond fund. 57 But unlike the section 103 exemption, the effective
exemption for the investment return on the CFC's retained earnings does
not inure to the benefit of a U.S. state or local government. Instead, the
exemption is captured by the CFC's U.S. shareholders. Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, the earnings yield an equity-based instead of a fixed in-
come-based return.58
Regardless of which of the preceding analytical approaches is used to
describe deferral (an interest-free loan, a device to make the U.S. Treas-
ury a forced equity investor or a regime for achieving tax-free reinvest-
ment of retained earnings), the deferral privilege is clearly a substantial
tax incentive that is not made available for earnings from domestic opera-
tions. Thus, many tax academicians view it as inappropriate encourage-
ment for U.S. taxpayers to locate operations abroad (i.e., as a violation of
the capital export neutrality norm). 59 By contrast, corporate executives
and their professional advisers generally regard deferral as necessary to
make U.S. businesses competitive in low-tax foreign markets against for-
eign multinationals whose home countries permit either deferral or ex-
emption for foreign source income (i.e., as compelled by the capital
import neutrality norm). 611 Still other observers regard deferral as re-
56. Under an exemption regime, the United States would impose no tax on foreign
source income, even when it is repatriated. Thus, the only applicable tax would be the tax
imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. See generally GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUOH, supra
note 1, at 14-17, 223.
57. See I.R.C. § 103.
58. We speculate that the pre-tax equity based return for CFCs would be higher than
for a comparable investment conducted through a foreign branch because deferral is elec-
tive (by making the choice to use a foreign business entity taxable for U.S. purposes as a
corporation) and, to the extent the CFC engages in related-party transactions, there is an
incentive at the margin to shift income to the lower-taxed entity. Because U.S. transfer
pricing regulations acknowledge that a range of prices may be considered to be arm's
length, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e), it is possible for such income shifting to occur without
running afoul of the section 482 transfer pricing rules. Moreover, to the extent U.S. in-
come that otherwise would be subject to current U.S. taxation is shifted to a CFC and is
eligible for deferral, U.S. revenue loss will result.
59. See CHARLES I. KINOSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 451-52 (1998); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, More on U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L
1943 (1998). Under capital export neutrality, a U.S. person should pay the same total (U.S.
and foreign) tax on all income, regardless of whether the income is from U.S. or foreign
sources; thus, capital export neutrality is aimed at reducing the influence of tax considera-
tions on the decision whether to locate investments abroad or in the United States. See,
e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERON[ & PUGH, supra note 1, at '17; see also David P. Hariton, Notice
98-11 Notwithstanding, What Should Be Done With Subpart F?, 79 TAX NOTES 388 (1998).
60. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 335-38; KINGSON, supra note
59, at 452; H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 57-58 (1962); see also Michael DeHoff, Letter to the
Editor, 17 TAX NOTES INT'L 1318, 1321 (1998); Kenneth J. Kies, Letter to the Editor, 81
TAX NOTES 138 (1998); Interview with Daniel M. Berman, 76 TAX NOTES 1387, 1390
(1997). Under capital import neutrality, all firms operating in the same industry in a par-
ticular foreign country are taxed at the same level, regardless of whether those firms are
owned by U.S. or foreign persons; thus, capital import neutrality is focused on the effect of
U.S. tax rules on the competitiveness of U.S. persons (including U.S. multinational corpo-
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quired to counterbalance elements of the Internal Revenue Code that
discriminate against the foreign source income of U.S. taxpayers (e.g.,
foreign tax credit limitation, interest allocation rules) 6 1 or as compelled
by the principle of free trade.62
Although this conflict of views seems unresolvable, the dramatic favor-
itism of foreign income over domestic income that results from the defer-
ral privilege would seem to leave the defenders of deferral with the
burden of empirically demonstrating that the privilege does no more than
offset the tax burdens on foreign business operations listed immediately
above. A mere recitation of those burdens should not be sufficient.
Moreover, deferral advocates must recognize that they can hold to their
position only if they ignore, or discount, certain anomalies in the U.S.
deferral system that cause its benefits to be only loosely coordinated with
the justifications advanced in favor of deferral and with other important
policy considerations. To be specific:
1. Because the benefit of deferral increases to the degree that repatria-
tion of CFC income is delayed, U.S. taxpayers that can afford to
postpone repatriation are favored over those that cannot. None of
the preceding pro-deferral rationales support this result.
2. Retention and reinvestment of earnings by the CFC are encouraged
even though the CFC's U.S. shareholders might be able to invest its
earnings in the United States at higher before-tax rates of return
than are obtainable by the CFC.
3. Deferral is fully available without regard to whether the U.S. tax-
payer has little competition in the foreign country (for example, a
pharmaceutical company selling patent-protected drugs) or faces
fierce competition.
4. Deferral is fully available even if the U.S. taxpayer's principal com-
petitor in a particular foreign country is another U.S. taxpayer. The
struggle in foreign markets between U.S. software manufacturers is
an example of this case.
5. Deferral is fully available regardless of the degree to which the
CFC's United States shareholders are, or are not, adversely affected
by the foreign tax credit limitation, the interest allocation rules, and
other elements of the U.S. tax system that proponents of deferral
believe discriminate against foreign source income.
6. The availability of, and degree of benefit from, deferral is unrelated
to whether the United States has a foreign policy or economic assist-
rations) operating in foreign markets. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note
1, at 17; see also Hariton, supra note 59.
61. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-8, -10, -17; Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-9T, -10T, -liT, -
12T, -14T; see Cooper, Melcher & Stretch, supra note 31, at 886, 891; see also U.S. Treasury
Dep't, Interim Rep., supra note 51, at 30-31; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INCOME 104, 134-36 (1992).
62. See, e.g., J.D. Foster, On "Logic' and Subpart F: Responses to Avi-Yonah and Hari-
ton, 80 TAX NOTES 259 (1998).
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ance objective that is furthered by having the U.S. taxpayer operate
in a particular country.
In short, making the case for the deferral privilege is not an easy task
and it is not surprising that some regard the effort as unsuccessful. This
skepticism has played a major role in the gradual legislative imposition of
limitations on deferral.
III. LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF
ANTI-DEFERRAL PROVISIONS 63
A. ORIGINS OF THE DEFERRAL PRIVILEGE
The deferral privilege has been a part of our income tax system since its
inception. Starting with the enactment of a corporate excise tax based on
income in the Revenue Act of 1909, the United States has imposed tax on
the worldwide income from all sources of a domestic corporation.64 For-
eign income of a non-U.S. corporation not connected with a U.S. busi-
ness, however, has never been subject to U.S. entity-level taxation. Thus,
U.S. persons conducting business or holding investments through a for-
eign corporation have been able to defer U.S. income tax on the corpora-
tion's earnings until they are distributed or the U.S. person sells his, her
or its stock in the foreign corporation, absent statutory limitations on the
deferral privilege.
B. EARLY ANTI-DEFERRAL MEASURES
1. Sections 367(a) and 482
The earliest anti-deferral measures were not provisions relating to the
taxation of income earned by a foreign corporation, but were provisions
intended to assure that income realized economically within the U.S. tax-
ing jurisdiction would not escape U.S. taxation. These provisions were
the predecessors to sections 367 and 482. The development of these
rules, as well as the more traditional anti-deferral regimes discussed be-
low, illustrates the difficulty of managing the deferral privilege in a coher-
ent manner.
Section 367. In 1932, the predecessor to section 367(a) was enacted to
prevent appreciated property from being transferred tax-free from the
63. For an overview of the historical development of the U.S. taxation of foreign
business operations of U.S. multinationals (written from a pro-business perspective), see
William P. McClure & Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to
1989: How a Titled Playing Field Developed, 43 TAX NOTES 1379 (1989). Abbreviated
discussions of the historical background of the anti-deferral rules may be found in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION (PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF
UNITED STATES PERSONS) 171-77 (1978) [hereinafter ALI PROPOSALS] and in GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 335-40.
64. See Revenue Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13 (1909). This
pattern continued with adoption of the income tax in 1913. See Income Tax Act of 1913,
Pub. L. No. 63-16, § Il(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).
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U.S. taxing jurisdiction.65 Section 367(a) has become the principal guard-
ian of the United States' taxing jurisdiction with respect to untaxed ap-
preciation of tangible assets transferred by a U.S. person to a foreign
corporation in connection with enumerated tax-free exchanges.
In the predecessor version of section 367, section 112(k) of the Reve-
nue Act of 193266 provided that certain otherwise tax-free transfers of
stock or securities involving foreign corporations were nonrecognition
transactions only if the taxpayer established before the exchange or dis-
tribution occurred that the transaction was not in pursuance of a plan
having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income
taxes. A taxpayer established that the principal purpose of a transaction
was not to avoid federal income taxes by obtaining a ruling from the IRS.
The targeted abuse was a tax-free transfer of stock by a U.S. person to a
Canadian corporation followed by a sale of the stock by the Canadian
corporation that was not taxable in Canada. The Canadian corporation
liquidated and repatriated the proceeds to the U.S. person without fur-
ther tax.67
In 1968, the Service issued guidelines, modified by subsequent revenue
rulings and procedures, for when favorable private rulings ordinarily
would be issued. 68 As a condition to obtaining a favorable ruling, the
1968 guidelines required the taxpayer to agree to include certain items in
income (a "toll charge"). The toll charge generally reflected untaxed ac-
cumulated earnings and profits in the case of inbound transfers and the
immediate potential earnings from liquid assets or the untaxed apprecia-
tion in passive investment assets and inventory in the case of outbound
transfers. 69 The 1968 guidelines represented the first comprehensive
statement of the policies that the IRS would apply in granting section 367
rulings.70
65. See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 112(k), 47 Stat. 169, 198 (1932).
For a review of current Section 367(a) and the policies underlying the rules, see Philip
Tretiak, Section 367(a) Transfers in 1998: All You Need To Know!, 80 TAX NOTES 239
(1998).
66. Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169 (1932).
67. In the accompanying committee reports, Congress expressed concern that taxpay-
ers would transfer appreciated stock or securities to foreign corporations that would sell
them and repatriate the proceeds without U.S. tax on any of the transactions. See H.R.
REP. No. 72-708, at 20 (1932); S. REP. No. 72-665, at 26 (1932).
68. See Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
69. See id.
70. See James B. Sitrick, Section 367 and Tax Avoidance: An Analysis of the Section
367 Guidelines, 25 TAx L. REV. 429 (1970). The substance of the statutory language that
became section 367 in the 1954 Code remained essentially unchanged until it was amended
in 1971 to provide that the requisite ruling could be obtained after the exchange in the case
of mere changes in the form of organization of a lower-tier foreign subsidiary. See Pub. L.
No. 91-681, 84 Stat. 2065 (1971). In addition, contributions to capital by controlling share-
holders and section 355 distributions were specified as transactions to which section 367
applied. See id. Contributions by noncontrolling shareholders were made subject to the
Section 1491 excise tax. See id. The constructive exchange rule of section 367(c)(2) with
respect to capital contributions was enacted in response to the decision in Abegg Cresta
Corp. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 145 (1968), afrd on other grounds, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 1008 (1971). In Abegg, the Tax Court had held that section 367
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The Tax Reform Act of 197671 amended section 367 in significant pro-
cedural respects. In the case of outbound transactions, revised section
367(a) allowed taxpayers to file a ruling request up to 183 days after the
transfer and expedited Tax Court review was provided in the event of an
adverse determination. Section 367(b) provided that no ruling was re-
quired with respect to inbound and foreign-to-foreign transactions and
tax-free treatment applied except as to transactions the IRS identified in
regulations. Pursuant to this statutory authority, in 1977 the IRS issued
temporary regulations that imposed a notification requirement and re-
quired taxpayers to include in income appropriate amounts (a "toll
charge") to reflect realized gain with respect to certain transactions. 72
Section 367 was significantly amended again in 1984, when the ruling re-
quirement (a ruling that the "principal purpose" of a section 367(a) out-
bound transfer was not the avoidance of federal income tax) was replaced
with objective standards derived from prior administrative ruling posi-
tions and the requirement of a ruling was eliminated.
As amended in 1984, the general rule of section 367(a) is that, for pur-
poses of determining gain on the transfer of property, the foreign corpo-
ration will not be considered a corporation and the nonrecognition rules
in question will not apply. This general rule is subject to statutory and
regulatory exceptions. Except as provided in regulations, the general rec-
ognition rule of section 367(a)(1) does not apply to a transfer of stock or
securities in a foreign corporation that is a party to the exchange or reor-
ganization. 73 In addition, certain "outbound" (i.e., from a U.S. person to
a foreign corporation) transfers of tangible assets used in the active con-
duct of a trade or business outside the United States and certain transfers
of stock and securities are excepted from the general recognition rule.74
Various categories of tainted assets, including intangible property, are not
eligible for the "active trade or business" exception. 75 Section 367(d)
provides special rules for outbound transfers of intangible property,
which generally treat the property as sold for royalty payments contin-
gent on the productivity, use or disposition of the intangible over its ex-
pected life. 76 Section 6038B requires that the IRS be notified of transfers
was not applicable to a transfer of securities by a nonresident alien to his wholly owned
foreign corporation where stock in the transferee foreign corporation was not received in
exchange. Abegg subsequently was overruled to the extent it held that section 351 would
not apply to a transfer to a wholly owned corporation in the absence of issuance of addi-
tional stock. See Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824, 835-36 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989).
71. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1042, 90 Stat. 1520, 1634-35 (1976).
72. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 7.367(b)-i through -13 (1977). The temporary regulations
would be amended by Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 7.367(b)-i through -6.
73. See I.R.C. § 367(a)(2).
74. See id. at 367(a)(3).
75. In addition, in 1988, section 367(a)(5) was added to limit tax-free transfers of as-
sets in outbound asset reorganizations. See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1006(e)(13)(A), 102
Stat. 3342, 3402 (1988).
76. As enacted in 1984, the deemed royalty under section 367(d) was U.S. source,
substantially increasing the risk of double taxation. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 131(b), 98
Stat. 494, 663-64 (1984). The U.S. source rule was deleted in 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-34,
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to foreign persons, and provides penalties for failing to comply.
Searching for coherence in Section 367. The section 367 "outbound"
transfer rules differ according to whether intangible property, stock or
securities or tangible personal property is being transferred to a foreign
corporation. Transfers of tangible property for use in a trade or business
outside the United States are the most favored, since they may be trans-
ferred in a tax-free transaction without the requirement of a gain recogni-
tion agreement. Transfers of intangible property to a foreign corporation
for stock, with few exceptions, are taxable. Transfers of stock or securi-
ties are subject to rules that generally permit tax-free transfers provided
that the transferring U.S. shareholder is a sufficiently small shareholder
of the transferee foreign corporation or the shareholder enters into an
agreement to recognize gain as of the time of the initial transfer if the
transferee foreign corporation sells the transferred stock within a five-
year period.7 7 Transfers of stock in a domestic corporation generally are
taxable if U.S. transferors own more than 50% of the transferee foreign
corporation after the transaction. This latter rule was adopted to prevent
U.S. parent corporations from expatriating to escape Subpart F.78
The section 367 rules have been placed under stress by the adoption of
the "check-the-box" entity classification regulations. For example, the
tax-free transfer of stock in a foreign corporation in exchange for five
percent or more of the stock in another foreign corporation generally
requires a five-year gain recognition agreement.7 9 If all of the stock in
the foreign corporation is transferred, however, and the transferred for-
§ 1131(b)(4), 111 Stat. 788, 979 (1997). Before 1985, the IRS allowed intangible property
to be transferred without a toll charge to a foreign corporation for foreign manufacturing
or consumption. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-04-026 (Oct. 21, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-05-004
(Sept. 29, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-05-113 (Nov. 4, 1983); see also Dittler Bros., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 896 (1979), affd per curiam, 642 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981).
77. The policies behind the stock transfer rules often are unclear. For example, why
should a gain recognition agreement entered into by a five percent shareholder be trig-
gered by a sale of transferred stock by a transferee foreign corporation if that shareholder
would be taxed currently on the gain realized by the transferee foreign corporation under
any of the Subpart F, foreign personal holding company or PFIC rules? The only potential
reason to cause the gain on the initial transfer to be recognized would be to preserve U.S.
source characterization of the unrecognized gain as of the time of the initial transfer to the
transferee foreign corporation. The gain recognition agreement could provide that it
would not be triggered if gain on the sale is taken into account under one of the anti-
deferral regimes and the gain is treated as U.S. source up to the amount of unrecognized
gain as of the date of the initial transfer.
78. The adoption of the section 956A excess passive asset rules in the 1993 Act caused
many U.S. multinationals to consider changing the domicile of the parent company to a
non-U.S. location. The most highly publicized of such transactions in this period was un-
dertaken by the Helen of Troy Company, which merged with a subsidiary of a newly
formed Bermuda company and transferred its non-U.S. subsidiaries to the new Bermuda
parent. This provoked the IRS to issue I.R.S. Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356, which pros-
cribes tax-free treatment of an outbound transfer of stock in a domestic corporation in
exchange for stock in a foreign corporation if U.S. transferors receive more than 50% of
the voting power or value of the foreign transferee corporation in the exchange or if cer-
tain other conditions are not satisfied. Final regulations implementing and refining Notice
94-46 are at Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c).
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(b).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
eign corporation changes its classification from an association to a pass-
through entity (i.e., a disregarded entity), the transfer would be treated as
a foreign-to-foreign transfer of assets and no gain recognition agreement
would be required." In this "check-the-box" case a subsequent sale of
the transferred "stock" would be treated for U.S. income tax purposes as
a sale of assets and might not be taxable by either the foreign country
(e.g., if it had a "participation exemption" for gains from the sale of
stock) or the United States (so long as the assets were used in the busi-
ness and did not give rise to passive income). Ironically, this is a case
where the outbound stock transfer (recast as an asset transfer) should be
subject to a gain recognition requirement.81
The section 367 rules are an important part of the U.S. tax structure
made necessary by the deferral subsidy. The evolution of these rules re-
flects an effort to balance preservation of the U.S. tax base and nonrecog-
nition for legitimate business reorganizations. In the absence of a guiding
tax policy principle on which to base a stable compromise, however, the
Congress and the Treasury have tinkered continuously with the rules'
structure.
Section 482. A significant impetus for adoption of the Subpart F re-
gime in 1962 was the perception that U.S. companies were engaging in
transfer pricing manipulations to earn profits in tax havens. Although it
serves a broader purpose as well, Subpart F acts as a "backstop" to the
section 482 transfer pricing rules.8 2
In 1962, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to section
482 that would have provided for formula apportionment of income from
the sale of tangible property, unless the taxpayer demonstrated that it
used an "arm's length price" or an alternative method that clearly re-
flected income. 83 The Conference Committee struck the provision but
instructed the Treasury to consider section 482 and "explore the possibil-
ity of developing and promulgating regulations under this authority which
would provide additional guidelines and formulas for the allocation of
income and deductions in cases involving foreign income."84 This led to
the issuance of proposed regulations under section 482 in 196585 and
80. See Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141; Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(a).
81. The example in the text also illustrates how U.S. tax rules, particularly as they
relate to deferral of U.S. tax on income or gain earned by a foreign corporation, and for-
eign rules for taxing the same income or gain, increasingly may be "arbitraged." See Ro-
senbloom, supra note 5; I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18; infra text accompanying
notes 161-170; see also I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 I.R.B. 49. With respect to U.S. tax rules,
the success of the arbitrage depends on the many exceptions to current taxation under the
U.S. anti-deferral regimes. One response to tax "arbitrage" is to adopt a comprehensive
income tax base. Minimizing the scope of tax deferral on income earned by a foreign
corporation would be a significant step in this direction.
82. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482(e).
83. H.R. 10650, 87th Cong. § 6, reprinted in House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th
Cong., Legislative History of the Revenue Act of 1962 (Comm. Print 1967).
84. H.R. REP. No. 87-2508, at 18-19 (1962).
85. See 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965).
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1966,86 and the promulgation of final regulations in 1968.87
In the 1960s, the focus of transfer pricing was on transfers of tangible
property and services. In the early 1980s, however, the IRS addressed the
efforts of U.S. pharmaceutical and electronics companies to take advan-
tage of the section 936 tax subsidy for business profits earned in Puerto
Rico to shift substantial amounts of income from intangibles, including
patented drugs and high technology machines and manufacturing
processes, to their section 936 subsidiaries operating in Puerto Rico.88 In
addition, similar strategies were used to maximize the benefits from
deferral for income earned in low-tax manufacturing locations such as
Ireland and Singapore.89 In response, section 482 was amended in 1986
to require that income with respect to a transfer or license of intangible
property be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangi-
ble." 90 A corresponding amendment was made to section 367(d). Final
regulations implementing these statutory changes were adopted in 1994.
Although the U.S. transfer pricing rules have been materially strength-
ened (and bolstered by the section 6662 penalties for substantial valua-
tion misstatements), the 1994 section 482 regulations acknowledge that
there may be a range of arm's length transfer prices. 91 In many cases the
range may be material. Accordingly, even the improved U.S. transfer
pricing regime leaves substantial scope for taking advantage of the defer-
ral privilege.
2. Foreign Personal Holding Companies
In 1937, the use by U.S. individual taxpayers of foreign corporations to
hold investments and thereby serve as "foreign incorporated pocket-
books" triggered adoption of the foreign personal holding company
(FPHC) rules. 92 The FPHC anti-deferral regime requires a U.S. person
86. See 31 Fed. Reg. 10,394 (1966).
87. See 33 Fed. Reg. 5848 (1968).
88. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 856 F.2d. 855 (7th Cir. 1988); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987).
89. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), affd, 933 F.2d
1084 (2d Cir. 1991); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991).
90. Section 482 now reads as follows:
SECTION 482. ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS AMONG TAXPAY-
ERS. In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States,
and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, appor-
tionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or
license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
I.R.C. § 482.
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e).
92. See Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, § 201, 50 Stat. 813, 818-24 (1937);
H.R. REP. No. 75-1546, at 15-16 (1937).
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holding stock in the FPHC to include in income his, her or its share of
essentially all of the FPHC's undistributed income for the year if there is
concentrated ownership of the foreign corporation by five or fewer U.S.
individuals and the foreign corporation earns threshold amounts of cer-
tain passive, personal services or rental income. 93
C. ADOPTION OF SUBPART F AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
1. Background
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration recommended that the "tax
deferral privilege" be ended for U.S. corporations and individuals "on
their current share of the undistributed profits realized in that year by
subsidiary [or closely held] corporations organized in economically ad-
vanced countries. '94 In essence, the original proposal outlined by the
Kennedy Administration's submission to Congress would have included
all of the income of foreign corporations operating in developed coun-
tries in the income of their U.S. shareholders.
The Kennedy Administration message indicated that it viewed deferral
as a subsidy:
In some cases, this tax deferral has made possible indefinite post-
ponement of the U.S. tax; and, in those countries where income taxes
are lower than in the United States, the ability to defer the payment
of U.S. tax by retaining income in the subsidiary companies provides
a tax advantage for companies operating through overseas subsidiar-
ies that is not available to companies operating solely in the United
States.
To the extent that these tax havens and other tax deferral privi-
leges result in U.S. firms investing or locating abroad largely for tax
reasons, the efficient allocation of international resources is upset,
the initial drain on our already adverse balance of payments is never
fully compensated, and profits are retained and reinvested abroad
which would otherwise be invested in the United States. Certainly
since the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan has been
completed, there are no longer foreign policy reasons for providing
tax incentives for foreign investment in the economically advanced
countries.95
93. Foreign personal holding income is defined in section 553. As mentioned in Part I1
of this Article, a foreign corporation is classified as a FPHC if in any tax year five or fewer
persons who are U.S. citizens or residents own (directly or constructively through certain
attribution rules) more than 50% of the corporation's stock (a "U.S. group") and more
than 60% of the gross income of the corporation consists of passive income for purposes of
the FPHC rules. If a foreign corporation is an FPHC, each U.S. shareholder (including a
U.S. corporation or other entity) who holds stock on the last day of the tax year of the
FPHC, or, if earlier, the last day of its tax year on which a U.S. group exists with respect to
the FPHC, is required to include in gross income as a dividend such shareholder's pro rata
portion of the undistributed income of the FPHC (whether or not the income is passive),
even if no cash dividend is actually paid.
94. Message from the President of the United States Relative to Our Federal Tax Sys-




The Administration proposal met with extraordinary opposition from
the U.S. business and legal community. The counsel for the Joint Com-
mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation testified that the Congress could
not constitutionally tax shareholders on the undistributed income of for-
eign corporations, except in cases where such taxation was reasonably
necessary to prevent evasion or avoidance of tax.96 Congress declined to
adopt legislation that would end deferral altogether.
In cutting back the scope of the President's original proposal, the Con-
gress attempted to reach devices "designed to avoid either U.S. tax or tax
imposed by the foreign country. '97 The House Committee on Ways and
Means stated:
Your Committee's bill does not go as far as the President's recom-
mendations. It does not eliminate tax deferral in the case of operat-
ing businesses owned by Americans which are located in the
economically developed countries of the world. Testimony in hear-
ings before your committee suggested that the location of invest-
ments in these countries is an important factor in stimulating
American exports to the same areas. Moreover, it appeared that to
impose the U.S. tax currently on the U.S. shareholders of American-
owned businesses operating abroad would place such firms at a dis-
advantage with other firms located in the same areas not subject to
U.S. tax. 9 8
The Congress, then, chose to continue the deferral subsidy in the ex-
pectation that it would foster exports and preserve the competitiveness of
American-owned businesses. The debate over deferral has continued in
much the same vein over the succeeding 38 years. 99
96. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, on The Tax Recommendations
of the President, vol. 1, 311-313 (1961). The taxation of income under Subpart F has been
held to be constitutional. Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); L.E. Whitlock Est. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839 (1974).
97. H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 58 (1962).
98. H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 62 (1962). Although the Conference Committee
adopted the Senate bill with modifications, the Senate bill followed the House bill with
modifications.
99. As discussed later in this Article, in I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B. 18, the IRS
appeared to argue for a view that Congress intended to curb all deferral except what was
permitted under the Subpart F rules:
Subpart F was enacted by Congress to limit the deferral of U.S. taxation of
certain income earned outside the United States by CFCs, which are foreign
corporations controlled by United States shareholders. Limited deferral was
retained after the enactment of subpart F to protect the competitiveness of
CFCs doing business overseas. This limited deferral allows a CFC engaged in
an active business, and located in a foreign country for appropriate economic
reasons, to compete in a similar tax environment with non-U.S. owned cor-
porations located in the same country.
Although the debate quickly becomes semantic, it is difficult to read the 1962 legislative
history and conclude that Congress thought the general rule should be to tax income of a
CFC currently and the exception was to allow deferral to continue. See N.Y. St. B. Ass'n
Tax Sec., supra note 29, at 882.
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2. The Original Scope of Subpart F and Related Provisions
a. Overview
The Subpart F regime enacted in 1.962 is structurally the same as it is in
the law today, except that the statute included substantially broader ex-
emptions and relief provisions that have been eliminated by subsequent
legislation. Consequently, the reach of today's Subpart F anti-deferral
provisions is greater than as originally enacted. For purposes of exposi-
tion, the following discussion focuses on four structural features of the
U.S. Subpart F regime: the definition of a controlled foreign corporation
(CFC), the scope of income included currently, the shareholders who
must include the income and the nature of the taxing mechanism.
Definition of a CFC. The definition of a CFC relies on the presence of
one or more 10% or greater U.S. shareholders. In other words, there
must be a relatively small control group. This feature of the U.S. rules is
significant in that Subpart F effectively does not reach foreign corpora-
tions whose shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges so long as there is
not a control group comprised of 10% U.S. shareholders. Accordingly, a
number of multinationals that formerly had U.S. parent companies have
opportunistically adopted non-U.S. parent structures at least in part to
escape the reach of Subpart F over their foreign operations.lu °
Transactional approach to current taxation. Only certain income of the
CFC is taxed currently to its U.S. shareholders. This so-called transac-
tional approach may be contrasted with the entity approach of the FPHC
rules described above, the PFIC rules described below and certain con-
trolled foreign company regimes in other countries whereby all of the
income of the foreign corporation is taxed to the shareholders resident in
the relevant country. The transactional approach requires a separate ac-
counting for Subpart F income and adds enormous complexity to a CFC
regime. The scope of Subpart F income and the investment in U.S. prop-
erty rules are discussed below.
Definition of shareholders that must include income currently. Only
10% or greater U.S. shareholders are taxed currently on their share of
Subpart F income or increased investment in U.S. property. This restric-
tion on the affected taxpayers essentially excludes portfolio investments,
other than through an FPHC or, as discussed below, a foreign investment
company or a passive foreign investment company, from the scope of the
anti-deferral rules. However, the transactional approach to defining the
income subject to current taxation, described above, requires that the af-
fected shareholders have access to rather detailed financial information
regarding the foreign corporation. Shareholders with interests below a
certain shareholding threshold (Congress identified 10% as the appropri-
ate level) would often be unable to obtain this information from the cor-
poration and would be unable to compute their includible amounts.
100. See, e.g., ADT Ltd., Form S-4 (Apr. 2, 1997) (Bermuda corporation publicly traded
on New York Stock Exchange acquires Tyco International Ltd. in taxable transaction).
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Thus, an administrable CFC regime is compelled to excuse small
shareholders. 101
Method for including income. Finally, the method of Subpart F income
inclusion is consistent with recognition of the foreign corporation as an
entity for tax purposes. Although the income inclusion generally has
characteristics of a dividend, in that the amount of the inclusion is limited
to current earnings and profits, the statute does not use the term divi-
dend.1112 In very limited respects, Subpart F also has attributes of branch
taxation in that the character of income carries through to a United
States shareholder for personal holding company purposes. 10 3 There is
no suggestion, however, that character flows through more generally.
Most significantly, a CFC's losses do not carry through to a United States
shareholder. Thus, Subpart F properly is viewed as adopting a share-
holder rather than branch or pass-through model of taxation.
The following discussion describes the relevant Subpart F rules as ini-
tially enacted in greater detail in order to be able to delineate the scope
of the changes in subsequent legislation.
b. The Subpart F Taxing Mechanism and the Base Company
Income Rules
Definition of a CFC. Subpart F causes a United States shareholder in a
CFC to include in income currently the shareholder's pro rata share of
Subpart F income and increased investment in U.S. property. A CFC is
any foreign corporation if, on any day of its tax year, more than 50% of
(i) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote,
or (ii) the total value of the stock in the corporation, is owned directly,
indirectly or by attribution,t0 4 by United States shareholders.' 0 5 A
"United States shareholder" is defined to mean a United States person 0 6
that owns, directly, indirectly or by attribution, 10% or more of the total
101. The House Ways and Means Committee Report states that the 10% ownership "de
mininis rule" prevents attribution of undistributed income to shareholders where their
"interest is small and their influence on the corporation's policy is presumably negligible."
H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 59 (1962).
102. See I.R.C. § 952(c). By contrast to the designation of an FPHC inclusion and sec-
tion 1248 gain as a "dividend" in sections 551(b) and 1248(a), respectively, section 951
simply provides that amounts are included in gross income. See I.R.C. § 951(a).
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1(a) (flush language). The Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996 amended Section 512(b) to apply a look-through rule to characterize certain
Subpart F insurance income as unrelated business taxable income. See Pub. L. No. 104-
188, § 1603, 110 Stat. 1755, 1835 (1996). The House Committee Report disavowed the
position of one IRS private letter ruling that character flowed through a Subpart F income
inclusion for unrelated business taxable income purposes. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at
136 n.14 (1996).
104. The relevant indirect ownership and attribution rules are found in section 958(a)
and 958(b), respectively. See I.R.C. § 958(a)-(b).
105. See I.R.C. § 957(a). The ownership test is dropped to 25% for purposes of taking
into account Subpart F insurance income under section 953(a). See I.R.C. § 957(b).
106. "United States person" is defined in section 957(c) by cross-reference to section




combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote in a foreign
corporation.1"7
Subpart F income. The central elements of Subpart F income continue
to be (i) foreign base company income, 1 18 and (ii) income from the insur-
ance of U.S. risks. 1119 Foreign base company income initially included,
foreign personal holding company income and foreign base company
sales and services income. Foreign personal holding company income in-
cludes most categories of what might be thought of as "passive" or invest-
ment income (unless the income is subject to a high foreign tax or certain
other exceptions). Although "active" sales or services income generated
in the CFC's country of organization is not covered in Subpart F, "base
company" sales and services income is subject to current inclusion (unless
the income is subject to an exception).
"Foreign base company sales income" is defined to mean income, in-
cluding gross profit from sales or commissions, derived from the purchase
and sale of personal property, if the property is either purchased from or
sold to a related person, the property is manufactured, produced, grown,
or extracted outside the country in which the CFC is organized, 1 " and the
property is sold for use, consumption, or disposition outside that coun-
try.I Foreign base company services income is income derived from the
performance of services by the CFC for, or on behalf of, a related person
outside the country of incorporation of the CFC." 12 Income derived in
connection with services that are directly related to the sale of property
by the CFC or its principal are excluded. The definition of "related per-
son" includes individuals and entities that control or are controlled by the
CFC (or are entities controlled by persons that control the CFC).11 3
Limitations on Subpart F income. As originally enacted, Subpart F had
at least four provisions that excepted significant categories of income
from the reach of the current inclusion rule. First, (i) certain active rents
107. See I.R.C. § 951(b). A United States person who owns less than 10% of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock of the CFC entitled to vote, directly or indi-
rectly, or by attribution, is not taxed on the undistributed income of the CFC.
108. See I.R.C. § 952(a)(2).
109. The definition of insurance income was substantially broadened in 1986 and is no
longer limited to the insurance of U.S. risks. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(b)(1), 100 Stat.
2085, 2551 (1986). Because of the single-industry focus of the Subpart F insurance income
rules, as well as their general difficulty and complexity, this Article does not discuss them
in any detail. For a useful review of the rules' policy and history, see Mary Gillmarten,
Active Financing Income-Back to the Future, 27 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 491 (1998).
110. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(A). Property manufactured by the CFC is not included in
foreign base company sales income.
Il1. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(l)(B).
112. See I.R.C. § 954(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-4.
113. "Control of a corporation" means ownership, directly or indirectly, of stock pos-
sessing more than 50% of either (i) the total voting power of all the stock entitled to vote,
or (ii) the total value of all the stock of a corporation. To determine stock ownership, both
the foreign entity look-through rules of section 958(a) and the constructive ownership rules
of section 958(b) apply. In the case of a partnership, trust, or estate, "control" means that
the CFC owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50% (by value) of the beneficial interests
in the partnership, trust, or estate. I.R.C. § 954(d)(3).
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and royalties from unrelated persons, (ii) certain dividends, interest, and
gains derived from financing or insurance businesses, (iii) certain same
country dividends, interest, rents, and royalties from related persons, and
(iv) interest received by a bank from another bank, were excluded from
the definition of foreign personal holding company income.1 4 Second, if
less than 30% of a CFC's gross income would be treated as foreign base
company income, then none of the CFC's income would be foreign base
company income. 1" 5 Third, foreign base company income did not include
an item of income if it was established to the satisfaction of the Treasury
that the creation or organization of the CFC under the laws of the coun-
try where it was incorporated did not have the effect of a substantial re-
duction of income or similar taxes with respect to that income. 116
Fourth, if certain minimum distributions were made to U.S. shareholders
of the CFC, then a domestic corporate shareholder could elect to exclude
from income its share of the CFC's Subpart F income. 117
c. Related Anti-Deferral Provisions
Increased investment in U.S. property. The 1962 Revenue Act also
adopted a "backstop" rule that would prevent a CFC from making cer-
tain investments in U.S. property that Congress believed could be
equivalent to a dividend being paid to the CFC's shareholders.' 18 Gener-
ally, a United States shareholder is taxed on previously untaxed earnings
of the CFC to the extent that the CFC increased its investments in U.S.
property such as stock or debt of a related U.S. person or tangible prop-
erty located in the United States. Exceptions from the definition of U.S.
property were designed to allow normal commercial transactions with
U.S. persons.
Ordinary income characterization of gain on the sale of CFC stock to the
extent of untaxed earnings. In order to achieve "full U.S. taxation" of a
CFC's earnings, a United States shareholder's gain on the sale of stock in
a CFC is characterized as dividend income to the extent of the share-
holder's share of untaxed post-1962 earnings accumulated during the
shareholder's holding period. In Congress' view, these amounts should
be taxed in effect as dividends.119
114. See I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(3), (c)(4) (1962). Among other effects of this exclusion was to
permit foreign banks and securities firms that were CFCs to operate substantially free of
the reach of Subpart F.
115. See I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) (1962). As is the case today, if more than 70% of a
CFC's gross income would be treated as foreign base company income, then all of the
CFC's income would be foreign base company income. See I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(B) (1962).
116. See I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (1962).
117. See I.R.C. § 963 (1962).
118. See S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 88 (1962). The House version of this provision also
would have covered investments of earnings in "nonqualified property," including non-
U.S. property not necessary for the active conduct of an active trade or business outside
the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 63-65 (1962). This 1962 House bill pre-
cursor to the section 956A "excess passive asset" rule adopted in 1993 and repealed in 1996
(see infra text accompanying notes 151-156) was deleted by the Senate.
119. See S. Rep. No. 87-1881, at 107 (1962).
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Foreign investment companies. The Congress was concerned about the
deferral that an individual shareholder could achieve by investing in a
foreign investment company instead of a regulated investment company
that distributed 90% of its earnings for the year.1211 In order to reduce
this disparity, section 1246 was adopted which caused gain on the sale of
stock in a foreign investment company to be treated as ordinary income
to the extent of the taxpayer's share of post-1962 earnings and profits.
For this purpose, a foreign investment company generally was defined to
mean a company that either was registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 or that invested primarily in securities at a time when
more than 50% of total voting power was owned, directly or indirectly, by
U.S. persons. 2 1
d. Observations
The effect of the definition of Subpart F income in 1962 was to reach
not only most passive income, but also to include "active" sales and serv-
ices income earned through a "base company" if a related person was
involved in the transaction. The Senate Finance Committee Report ob-
served that, as to passive income, "there is no competitive problem justi-
fying postponement of the tax until the income is repatriated."' 122 The
rationale as to base company sales and services income related to the
separation of the sales or services activity to secure a lower rate of (for-
eign) tax. The investment in U.S. property income inclusion and section
1248 and section 1246 gain recharacterization rules provided an addi-
tional fence around deferral, but were far from comprehensive. Each of
these rules later was expanded substantially.
The absence of a clear and principled anti-deferral policy, other than to
strike an ad hoc balance between current income inclusion to achieve
capital export tax neutrality and deferral to preserve competitiveness and
capital import neutrality, is the source of much of the difficulty in apply-
ing Subpart F in new contexts and in formulating an appropriate legisla-
tive regime. The variation in Subpart F legislative developments
subsequent to 1962 and, more recently, in administrative promulgations
as well, highlight the absence of a controlling policy rationale.
D. ANTI-DEFERRAL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1962
1. Piecemeal Expansion of Subpart F: 1963-1984
Although there were minor amendments to Subpart F in 1966 and
1969,123 1975 saw the first significant changes to the Subpart F regime. In
120. See S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 101 (1962).
121. See I.R.C. § 1246(b).
122. S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 83.
123. In 1966, section 952(b) was amended to permit Subpart F to include U.S. source
income that was exempt or subject to a reduced rate of U.S. tax under an income tax
treaty. See Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 104(j), 80 Stat. 1539, 1562 (1966). In 1969, section
954(b)(4) was amended to liberalize the exception for when the organization or creation of
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1975, Congress repealed the minimum distribution exception to Subpart
F 124 as well as the exception for Subpart F income reinvested in less-
developed countries.12 5 Congress also modified the Subpart F de minimis
rule providing that a CFC would not have Subpart F income if less than
30% of the CFC's gross income was Subpart F income by reducing the
threshold to 10% of the CFC's gross income. 12 6 A new category of Sub-
part F income, shipping income, was added to the foreign base company
income. 127 The only modification in the 1975 legislation that reduced the
scope of Subpart F was a limited exception from the foreign base com-
pany sales rules for agricultural commodities that were not produced in
commercial and marketable quantities in the United States. 128 The ex-
pansion of Subpart F finally adopted was in response to, and far less ex-
pansive than, a Senate proposal to end deferral for all income of foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.12 9
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (1976 Act), Congress expanded excep-
tions to the definition of U.S. property in order to permit investment of
CFC earnings in stock or debt of domestic corporations that were not
related to the CFC and also to permit holding of properties for exploring,
developing or transporting resources from or under U.S. continental shelf
ocean waters. 130 In 1982, "foreign base company oil and gas related in-
come" (FORI) was added to the definition of foreign base company in-
come. 13' Generally, under sections 954(a)(5) and 954(f), United States
shareholders of a CFC are taxed on the foreign oil related income of the
CFC from countries other than those in which the oil and gas is extracted
or consumed. FORI includes income from processing, transportation,
distribution and sales, and services. In 1984, Congress added related
party factoring income to the definition of foreign personal holding com-
pany income. 132
2. The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Expansion of Subpart F
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act) substantially expanded the
Subpart F anti-deferral regime by adding categories of Subpart F income
and narrowing exceptions. Taking account of the expanded role of inter-
the CFC did not have the effect of a substantial reduction of income, war profits or other
taxes to provide the exception if (i) the organization or creation of the CFC, or (ii) the
effecting of a transaction through the CFC, did not have as one of its significant purposes a
substantial reduction of income, war profits or other taxes. See Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 909(a), 83 Stat. 487, 718 (1969).
124. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(a), 89 Stat. 26, 58 (1975).
125. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(c), 89 Stat. 26, 58-60 (1975).
126. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(e), 89 Stat. 26, 64 (1975).
127. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(d)(1)(A), 89 Stat. 26, 60-61 (1975).
128. See Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(b), 89 Stat. 26, 58 (1975).
129. The amendment to the Senate bill to end deferral was added in a 73 to 24 floor
vote. See 121 CONG. REC. 7498-7500 (1975).
130. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1021 (a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1618-19 (1976).
131. See Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 212(a), 96 Stat. 324, 451 (1982).
132. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 123(a), 98 Stat. 494, 644-46 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 864(d) (1984)).
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national portfolio investment, the 1986 Act also added the passive foreign
investment company anti-deferral regime.
Foreign personal holding company income. The definition of Subpart F
foreign personal holding company income was amended to include (i)
gains from sales of non-inventory property that is held for the production
of passive income or that does not give rise to income, (ii) gains from
commodities transactions (other than in the course of acting as a dealer),
(iii) net foreign currency gains attributable to section 988 transactions
(unless directly related to the business needs of the CFC), and (iv) in-
come equivalent to interest, including commitment fees for loans actually
made. 33 The "same country" exception for dividends and interest re-
ceived from a related corporation organized in the same country was nar-
rowed by requiring that the payor of dividends or interest have a
substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business in the same for-
eign country and, in the case of interest, by denying the exception to the
extent that the payment reduced the payor's Subpart F income. 134 Per-
haps most significantly, the exception from foreign personal holding com-
pany income for interest, dividends, and gains from the sale or exchange
of stock or securities derived in the conduct of a banking, finance, or
other similar business, or derived from investments made by an insurance
company of its ordinary and necessary unearned premiums or reserves,
from unrelated persons, was repealed. 135 The repeal of the banking, fi-
nancing and insurance exception essentially caused United States share-
holders to be taxed currently on their share of a CFC's dividend and gain
income from banking, securities or insurance businesses without regard
to whether the income was directly related to their active business.136
The Republican-controlled Senate Finance Committee articulated the
following rationale for these changes:
The committee believes that deferral of U.S. tax on the income of
U.S.-owned foreign corporations is generally appropriate until such
income is repatriated or the stock of such foreign corporations is
sold. However, the committee believes that a 10% or greater U.S.
shareholder in a U.S.-controlled foreign corporation should not re-
ceive the benefits of deferral when a significant purpose of earning
income through the foreign corporation is the avoidance of tax.
Such a policy serves to limit the role that tax considerations play in
the structuring of U.S. persons' operations and investments. Be-
cause movable income earned through a foreign corporation could
often be earned through a domestic corporation instead, the commit-
tee believes that a major motivation of U.S. persons in earning cer-
tain kinds of income through foreign corporate vehicles often is the
133. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221 (a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2549-51 (1986).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. As discussed below, in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1005, 112 Stat 2681, 2681-890 (1998).
Congress restored the exemption from Subpart F for certain active banking, financing and
insurance income. See I.R.C. § 954(h) (1998).
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tax benefit expected to be gained thereby. The committee believes
that it is generally appropriate to impose current U.S. tax on easily
movable income earned through a controlled foreign corporation,
since there is likely to be limited economic reason for the U.S. per-
son's use of [a] foreign corporation. The committee believes that by
eliminating the U.S. tax benefits of such transactions, U.S. and for-
eign investment choices are placed on a more even footing, thus en-
couraging more efficient (rather than more tax-favored) uses of
capital. 137
Insurance income. The definition of insurance income for purposes of
Subpart F also was expanded to include all income attributable to the
issuing of any insurance or annuity contract in respect of unrelated per-
sons outside the insuring company's country of incorporation. This was a
substantial expansion beyond the prior rule which only included income
from the insurance or reinsurance of U.S. risks. The Democratic-con-
trolled House Ways and Means Committee's rationale for the application
of insurance rules to foreign as well as U.S. policies of insurance paral-
leled that of the Senate Finance Committee quoted above:
The committee believes that income from the insurance of risks
outside the insurer's country of incorporation should be subject to
current taxation regardless of whether the risks are located in the
United States and regardless of whether the insured is a related per-
son. Insurance income generally represents the type of inherently
manipulable income at which Subpart F is aimed, since such income
can frequently be routed through a corporation formed in any conve-
nient jurisdiction. (Indeed, several countries promote themselves as
jurisdictions for the formation of such corporations.) When a con-
trolled foreign corporation insures risks outside of the country in
which the corporation is organized, then it is appropriate to treat
that income as if it has been routed through that jurisdiction primar-
ily for tax reasons, regardless of whether the insured is a related or
unrelated person. In all such cases, it is appropriate to impose cur-
rent U.S. taxation under Subpart F.138
Other foreign base company income changes. Foreign base company
shipping income was expanded to include income derived from space or
ocean activity. 139 The 1986 Act also reduced the de minimis threshold
exclusion from foreign base company income and gross insurance income
to the lesser of 5% of the CFC's gross income or $1 million from 10% or
less of the CFC's gross income. 140
The congressional rationale for the 1986 Act expansion of the Subpart
F rules makes reference to neutrality, but the changes continued to be
piecemeal and did not effect a capital export neutrality principle. The
137. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 363 (1986).
138. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 395 (1985).
139. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(c)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2553 (1986). The 1986 Act
also repealed the exemption from foreign base company shipping income for amounts rein-
vested in foreign base company shipping operations. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221(c)(1),
100 Stat. 2085, 2553 (1986).
140. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1221 (a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2549-51 (1986).
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most coherent 1986 Act change to the anti-deferral rules, though flawed
in important respects, was the adoption of the passive foreign investment
company regime.
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Adoption of the Passive Foreign
Investment Company (PFIC) Regime
a. Overview
The enactment of the PFIC rules in the 1986 Act represented a sea
change in the scope of the U.S. anti-deferral rules. The definition of a
PFIC was intended to identify companies that were engaged in passive or
portfolio investments, so there was little rationale to permit deferral.
Targeted at investors in offshore investment funds structured to avoid ex-
isting anti-deferral rules, the PFIC regime implicitly recognized the sub-
stantially greater role of portfolio capital in U.S. international
investment.14'
For purposes of contrast with the Subpart F rules, we focus on the same
four structural features of the U.S. PFIC regime discussed above in rela-
tion to Subpart F: the definition of a PFIC, the scope of income included
currently, the shareholders who must include the income, and the nature
of the taxing mechanism.
Definition of PFIC. Although ostensibly targeted at offshore invest-
ment funds, the PFIC rules have a far broader reach. The principal rea-
son for the broad reach of the PFIC rules is the use of an asset test.142
The passive asset test proved extremely powerful as an indirect measure
of the accumulated earnings deferred from even an active business.
Entity approach to taxation. Once a foreign corporation is determined
to be a PFIC, the U.S. shareholder's entire share of income of the PFIC is
subject to the rough economic equivalent of current taxation.
Definition of shareholders that must include income on a current basis
(or its rough economic equivalent). All U.S. persons owning stock in a
PFIC, regardless of how small their shareholding, are subject to the PFIC
taxing rules.143
Method for taxing income. The PFIC rules' taxing mechanism is to ap-
ply an interest charge in respect of all of the deferred income of the PFIC
141. See Stanley I. Rubenfeld & Jesse R. Rubin, Passive Foreign Investment Companies:
The Pentapus Become the Sextapus, or Does I?, 36 TAx NOTES 199 (1987). U.S. portfolio
investment rose from $62 billion in 1980 to $1.4 trillion in 1997. See U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Survey of Current Business, July, 1998, at D52.
142. For example, the asset test has been interpreted to treat all cash as a passive asset,
whether or not it is working capital or otherwise held solely for use in the business. See
I.R.S. Notice 88-22, 1988-1 C.B. 489, 490. The breadth of the PFIC rules triggered a legisla-
tive reaction, in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1121, 111 Stat. 788,
971 (1997), that excludes United States shareholders of a CFC from the scope of the PFIC
rules. See I.R.C. § 1297(e), discussed infra text accompanying note 157. In effect, this
amendment carved out a U.S. multinational's subsidiaries from the PFIC rules. The legis-
lative change does not alter the asset test, however, so the PFIC rules may still apply to an
investor in a foreign operating joint venture as well as to an investor in an offshore fund.
143. See I.R.C. §§ 1291(a)(1), 1293(a)(1), 1296(a) (1988).
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unless the shareholder elects to include its share of the PFIC's earnings
currently in income. Although defective in specific design, the interest
charge represented a break-through approach to economically recaptur-
ing the deferral benefit. As an alternative, shareholders could elect to
report income currently (subject to obtaining information from the
PFIC). The interest charge taxing mechanism effectively permitted the
PFIC rules to be applied to an extremely small U.S. shareholder interest
because it does not require the shareholder to obtain information from
the corporation.
The PFIC rules are widely viewed as a possible model for ending defer-
ral altogether simply by changing the definition of a PFIC to include any
foreign corporation in which a U.S. shareholder holds a material interest.
Key elements of the rules, including 1988 technical changes, are outlined
in the following paragraphs.
b. The 1986 PFIC Rules In Brief
Definition of a PFIC. A foreign corporation is a PFIC with respect to a
U.S. shareholder if, for any tax year in which the U.S. shareholder holds
shares, either (i) 75% or more of the gross income of the foreign corpora-
tion for the tax year is passive income; or (ii) the average fair market
value of its assets during the tax year that produce passive income or that
are held for the production of passive income is at least 50% of the aver-
age fair market value of all of the foreign corporation's assets for such
year.144 For this purpose, passive income means, in general, dividends,
interest, royalties, rents (other than rents and royalties derived in the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business and from unrelated persons), annui-
ties, and gains from the sale of assets that would produce such income,
other than sale of inventory. 145 A foreign corporation could elect to ap-
ply the asset test using the average adjusted tax bases of assets (as deter-
mined for purposes of computing earnings and profits) during the tax
year. 146
PFIC look-through rules. For purposes of the PFIC tests, if a foreign
corporation owned directly or indirectly at least 25% by value of the
stock of another corporation, the foreign corporation would be treated as
owning its proportionate share of the assets of the other corporation, and
as if it had received directly its proportionate share of the income of such
other corporation. 147 The effect of this special provision with respect to
the foreign corporation and its direct and indirect ownership of its subsid-
iaries is that the foreign corporation, for purposes of the income and as-
sets tests described above, will be treated as owning directly its
proportionate share of the assets of the subsidiaries and of receiving di-
rectly its proportionate share of each of those subsidiaries' income, if any,
144. See 1.R.C. § 1296(a) (1988).
145. See I.R.C. § 1296(b)(1) (1988).
146. See I.R.C. § 1296(c) (flush language) (1988).
147. See I.R.C. § 1296(c) (1988).
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so long as the foreign corporation owns, directly or indirectly, at least
25% by value of the particular foreign corporation's stock. Income of the
foreign corporation's subsidiaries that does not constitute "passive in-
come" will be treated as non-passive income of the foreign corporation
for purposes of the PFIC tests. Significantly, if a foreign holding com-
pany is not a PFIC, after application of the look-through rules, a less than
50% U.S. shareholder would not be attributed ownership of stock in a
lower-tier PFIC.
Once a PFIC, always a PFIC. Shares held, directly or indirectly under
attribution rules, by a U.S. shareholder will be treated as stock in a PFIC
if, at any time during the holding period of the U.S. shareholder with
respect to such shares, the foreign corporation was a PFIC and the U.S.
shareholder did not elect to recognize gain as of the last day of the last
tax year for which the foreign corporation was a PFIC. 148
Taxation of a U.S. shareholder in a PFIC. If the foreign corporation
were to be classified as a PFIC, a direct or indirect U.S. shareholder
would be subject to an interest charge on taxes deemed deferred by her
on actual or deemed receipt of certain "excess" dividend distributions by
the foreign corporation and on recognition of gain on disposition of any
shares of the U.S. shareholder (all of which distributions and gains would
be taxable as ordinary income).149 Alternatively, a U.S. shareholder
could avoid the interest charge if the foreign corporation were to agree to
comply with certain reporting requirements and the U.S. shareholder
were to elect to be currently taxable on her pro rata share of the foreign
corporation's earnings and profits (excluding net capital gain) and net
capital gains for each year (at ordinary income and long-term capital
gains rates, respectively), even if no distributions were received. 150
4. The Expansion and Contraction of Subpart F (or Contraction and
Expansion of Deferral) in the 1990s
a. Legislative Developments
Following the 1992 election of President Clinton, and preceding the
election in 1994 of a Republican-controlled House and Senate, the 1993
Act was the high water mark of anti-deferral legislation. In the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,15' Congress adopted the excess pas-
sive asset rules of section 956A to restrict deferral of a CFC's untaxed
accumulated earnings invested in passive assets.152 Under section 956A,
a United States shareholder in a CFC had to include in income currently
its pro rata share of excess passive assets (passive assets in excess of the
25% of the average amount of total assets held at the end of each quar-
ter) to the extent of the lesser of its pro rata share of excess passive assets
148. See I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1) (1988).
149. See I.R.C. § 1291(a) (1988).
150. See I.R.C. § 1293 (1988).
151. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 416 (1993).
152. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 691-92 (1993).
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or earnings and profits. Also adopted in 1993 was a substantial expansion
of the investment in U.S. property taxing rules. Investments in U.S. prop-
erty were to be measured quarterly instead of annually and no longer
required an increased investment in U.S. property. Income inclusions
were measured according to current or accumulated earnings and profits
that were not previously taxed.
The excess passive asset rule essentially acted as a mechanical accumu-
lated earnings tax mechanism, forcing a deemed repatriation when un-
taxed earnings were accumulated in the form of passive assets (whether
U.S. or foreign) beyond a threshold amount and not reinvested in active
business assets. Not only was the income on a passive asset taxed, the
principal was included in income to the extent the threshold was ex-
ceeded and there were untaxed earnings of the CFC. There existed,
briefly, a cap on deferral. 153
The direction set in the 1993 Act was reversed in the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996154 (1996 Act). Addressing a Republican-con-
trolled Congress, the U.S. multinational community argued, and the Con-
gress found, that the section 956A excess passive asset rule provided an
incentive for CFCs to make investments in foreign assets they otherwise
would not have acquired in order to avoid the income inclusion. 155 Sec-
tion 956A was repealed for tax years after 1996.156
Emboldened by their 1996 success, the U.S. multinational community
turned to the next threat to deferral relating to investment of earnings in
passive assets. Although the PFIC rules had a 50% passive asset test that
generally would be difficult for an operating business to surpass, high-
profit electronic and pharmaceutical CFCs with manufacturing opera-
tions in low-tax jurisdictions had accumulated substantial amounts of in-
come, even to the point of having 50% passive assets. In the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (1997 Act), Congress provided that a United States
shareholder in a CFC would not be subject to the PFIC rules in respect of
that investment. 157
The 1997 Act also included a one-year exception from Subpart F for-
eign personal holding company income for income earned by a CFC in
the active conduct of an insurance, banking, financing or similar busi-
ness.158 The active banking and finance exception was vetoed by Presi-
dent Clinton using his new line item veto power, but the Line Item Veto
Act was subsequently held to be unconstitutional. 159 Congress extended
the active banking and finance exception for another year in 1998.160 As
153. Indeed, the provision had elements in common with a proposal in the original 1962
House bill that was not adopted by the Senate or Conference. See supra note 118.
154. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
155. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-586, at 129 (1996).
156. See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1501(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1755, 1825 (1996).
157. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1121, 111 Stat. 788, 971 (1997).
158. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1175, 111 Stat. 788, 990-93 (1997).
159. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
160. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1005, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). For a critique of this provision,
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applied to U.S. multinationals (outside of the oil and shipping industries),
the Subpart F rules were being returned to their 1975 configuration.
b. The Saga of I.R.S. Notice 98-11 and I.R.S. Notice 98-35
The adoption of the "check-the-box" entity classification rules effective
January 1, 1997, created opportunities to "base-erode" foreign taxable in-
come without triggering Subpart F income inclusions. A taxpayer could
use debt to generate deductible payments between a CFC and a legal
entity that is respected for foreign law purposes but disregarded for U.S.
tax purposes. In the absence of a branch rule that applies to foreign per-
sonal holding income, this and similar arrangements may be used to re-
duce the foreign tax on income eligible for deferral. On January 16, 1998,
the IRS issued I.R.S. Notice 98-11,161 announcing its intention to issue
regulations under Subpart F to prevent the use of certain arrangements
involving CFCs and "hybrid branches" to achieve this result. A hybrid
branch is regarded as a branch for U.S. tax purposes, but as a separate
entity (e.g., a corporation) for foreign tax purposes. On March 23, 1998,
the IRS issued temporary and proposed regulations implementing Notice
98-11.162 The temporary regulations covered transactions involving hy-
brid branches and equivalent transactions involving partnerships under
Subpart F. The proposed regulations, in addition to the provisions also
contained in the temporary regulations, covered the treatment of a CFC's
distributive share of income of a partnership in which a CFC is a
partner.163
Notice 98-11 and the subsequent regulations provoked a storm of com-
ment, including criticism that the proposed rules were without support in
the statute and therefore invalid.164 In I.R.S. Notice 98-35,t65 the Treas-
ury and the IRS announced their intention to withdraw the temporary
regulations and proposed regulations issued on March 23, 1998, and with-
drew Notice 98-11. Notice 98-35 also stated that proposed regulations on
hybrid transactions will be adopted, but will not be finalized before Janu-
ary 1, 2000.166
see Lee A. Sheppard, The Bermuda Triangle and Other Voids of Taxation, 80 TAX NOTES
430 (1998).
161. 1998-6 I.R.B. 18.
162. T.D. 8767, 1998-16 I.R.B. 4, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,613 (1998), which contained Temp.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.954-iT, -2T, -9T, and 301.7701-31' (1998).
163. See REG-104537-97, 1998-16 I.R.B. 21, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,669 (1998).
164. See, e.g., Cooper, Melcher & Stretch, supra note 31: Lee A. Sheppard, Sweet Tax
Nothings: Rethinking Treasury's Foreign Policy, 79 TAX NOTES 145 (1998); see also David
P. Hariton, International Double Nontaxation: A Response to Stuart Leblang, 80 TAX
NOTES 403 (1998); Stuart E. Leblang, International Double Nontaxation, 80 TAX NOTES
255 (1998): Stuart E. Leblang, International Double Nontaxation: Hariton Misses the Point,
80 TAX NOTES 507 (1998).
165. See 1998-27 I.R.B. 35.
166. See id. at 36. When finalized, the proposed regulations will be effective for all
payments made ol or after June 19, 1998, under hybrid arrangements, except as provided
under transition relief provisions. See id.
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Notices 98-35 describes regulations substantially unchanged from those
promulgated in March 1998. When certain conditions are present, the
non-Subpart F income of a CFC, in the amount of a "hybrid branch pay-
ment," will be recharacterized as Subpart F income of the CFC. 167 The
amount recharacterized as Subpart F income is the gross amount of the
hybrid branch payment limited by the amount of the CFC's earnings and
profits attributable to non-Subpart F income. 168 To the extent that the
full amount required to be recharacterized under this provision cannot be
recharacterized because it exceeds earnings and profits attributable to
non-Subpart F income, there will be no requirement to carry such
amounts back or forward to another year.169 The conditions for applica-
tion of the hybrid branch payment rule include:
[(i)] The hybrid branch payment reduces the foreign tax of the payor;
[(ii)] the hybrid branch payment would have been foreign personal
holding company income if made between separate CFCs; and [(iii)]
there is a significant disparity between the effective rate of tax on the
payment in the hands of the payee and the hypothetical rate of tax
that would have applied if the income had been taxed in the hands of
the payor.170
The Notice 98-11/98-35 debacle may be traced directly to the absence
of a consensus regarding the policy underlying Subpart F and the result-
ing mishmash of statutory rules. The Treasury understood the potential
of "hybrid branch" structures to reduce foreign tax on income eligible for
deferral and was concerned that, if left unchecked, the proliferation of
these structures would provide a strong tax inducement to move invest-
ment outside the United States. Reading the legislative history to imbue
the statute with a "capital export neutrality" intent, the Treasury supplied
the missing branch rule in its regulations. The resulting outcry reverber-
ated throughout 1998. While we have doubts about the Treasury's read-
ing of the legislative history of Subpart F, we believe that the Treasury's
policy concerns relating to the hybrid branch structure are legitimate and
illustrate some of the limitations of the current anti-deferral regimes.
E. OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.
ANTI-DEFERRAL REGIMES
The preceding review of the evolution of the principal elements of the
U.S. anti-deferral regimes is instructive. Before 1962, the U.S. anti-defer-
ral protections were limited and narrowly focused. Congress did not fully
embrace the capital export neutrality principle at the time of the adoption
of the Subpart F rules in 1962. The original proposal was cut back to
require current inclusion of most passive income and to target practices
(principally use of base companies in lower tax jurisdictions) that, even if
167. See id. at 35.
168. See id. at 36.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 35.
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they related to active businesses, could artificially reduce the effective
foreign tax to the extent that it could induce movement of investment
abroad. Viewed in this light, the resulting Subpart F structure served a
purpose much like that of section 367-namely, to protect the U.S. tax
base.
The developments from 1962 through the 1.993 Act generally further
curtailed the scope of deferral. Indeed, deferral was effectively elimi-
nated for passive income, shipping income, large categories of oil and gas
income, and banking and financing income. The trend since 1996 has
been to expand the deferral privilege, notably by repealing the excess
passive asset rules, eliminating application of the PFIC rules to United
States shareholders in a CFC and restoring an active banking, financing
and insurance exception to the Subpart F foreign personal holding com-
pany rules.
While the policy trends in this evolution are not easily discerned, one
trend has been inexorable-increased complexity and administrative bur-
den. In addition, irrespective of one's policy preference, the application
of the current anti-deferral rules is inconsistent across industries. It may
be argued that this outcome is inevitable so long as there is no consensus
regarding the appropriateness of the deferral privilege. The pass-through
proposal discussed in Part IX would be less complex and more neutral
across industries than current law.
IV. NON-U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANIES AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT FUND REGIMES
A. CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION
1. Background
In 1962, the United States was the first country to adopt controlled
foreign corporation anti-deferral legislation. As Part III of this Article
demonstrates, the objectives and design of the legislation were modified
during the course of congressional consideration. Based in part on a capi-
tal export neutrality objective and in part on anti-abuse objectives, the
product of this congressional compromise was a hybrid of both
approaches.
A 1996 study by Working Party No. 2 of the Committee on Fiscal Af-
fairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) reports that, as of June, 1995, fourteen OECD member coun-
tries (including the United States) had adopted controlled foreign compa-
nies (CFC) legislation.171 The varied approaches of these OECD
countries reflects the influence of the U.S. example and also signals an
ambivalence toward adoption of capital export neutrality as the predomi-
nant objective without regard to an actual or deemed finding of tax
171. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CON-




abuse. The OECD's recent consideration of CFC legislation in the con-
text of harmful tax competition, discussed below, suggests that the dis-
tinction between anti-abuse and capital export neutrality objectives can
be overstated.
Protecting the domestic tax base. A country manifests its policy prefer-
ence for capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality in the man-
ner that it taxes foreign income. A country that favors the capital import
neutrality principle adopts a territorial approach for taxing foreign in-
come. A country that favors the capital export neutrality principle taxes
worldwide income and allows an unlimited credit for foreign taxes.172
The method of taxing foreign income, however, is not determinative of
whether a country adopts CFC legislation. France, for example, favors
exemption of, or a reduced tax on, foreign income, but has adopted ex-
pansive CFC legislation. The crucial point is that a principal purpose of
CFC legislation for most countries is to protect the domestic tax base by
reducing the incentive to shift income-producing activity abroad. Indeed,
the need to protect the domestic tax base is more pronounced for a coun-
try that does not tax foreign income than for a country that taxes foreign
income and employs a foreign tax credit system.
Protecting against tax competition. In 1996, the Ministers of OECD
countries adopted a communique directing the OECD to "develop meas-
ures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on in-
vestment and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax
bases, and report back in 1998."1 73
In 1998, the OECD released its report on harmful tax competition, in
which it examined the issue of tax competition among countries in the
context of an increasingly global economic system. It enunciated factors
to identify tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes and made rec-
ommendations to counteract harmful tax competition. 174 The first rec-
ommendation of the report reads:
Recommendation concerning Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC)
or equivalent rules: that countries that do not have such rules con-
sider adopting them and that countries that have such rules ensure
that they apply in a fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing
harmful tax practices.1 75
The report observed that CFC rules may apply in situations which do
not involve harmful tax competition as defined in the report, but stated:
"It is recognized that countries retain their rights to use such rules in such
situations. ' 176
172. For a discussion of how the capital export neutrality criterion is applied in relation
to the taxation of foreign source income, see supra note 59 and GUSTAFSON, PERONI &
PUGH, supra note 1, at 16-18, 335-38; Shay, supra note 3, at 1044-46.
173. This communique is quoted in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 6
(OECD 1998) [hereinafter OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION].
174. See id. at Chs. 2 & 3.
175. See id. at 40-41.
176. Id. at 41.
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It is instructive to review the kinds of CFC rules that have been
adopted by other OECD countries.
2. Other Countries' Approaches to CFC Legislation
The OECD's CFC Report, which drew on Professor Brian J. Arnold's
comparative analysis of CFC regimes, 177 focused on certain characteris-
tics of CFC rules, including the definition of a CFC, whether the country
in question relied on a transactional or "target country" approach (or a
combination of the two), the type of income attributed to the taxpayer,
the taxpayers to whom income is attributed, and the nature of exemp-
tions (for entities or income) from the rules. The legislative approaches
for some of the fourteen countries studied in the OECD Report are sum-
marized in the table attached as Appendix A.
One difference between CFC regimes relates to whether a target coun-
try list is relied on or whether the CFC analysis is based on a transac-
tional or entity analysis. The United States utilizes a transactional
approach. Since we do not recommend a change to a target country list
approach, the following discussion focuses on three issues affecting a
transactional CFC regime: how the CFC is defined, the character of the
CFC's income that is attributed and the shareholders to whom income is
attributed.
Definition of CFC. In all of the countries reviewed, CFCs are defined
to be a foreign entity over which domestic taxpayers have substantial in-
fluence. Of these countries, the lowest threshold for application of the
CFC rules is that of France which applies its CFC regime to a foreign
corporation if a French company owns directly or indirectly 10% or more
in shares or has an investment in shares of 150 million French francs,
whichever is less.' 78 In most other cases, 50% control is required. As
discussed below, however, a number of countries have adopted foreign
investment fund (FIF) regimes, analogous to the U.S. PFIC rules, that
apply to companies not controlled by residents.
In determining control, another important difference among ap-
proaches is whether control is required to be held by a small control
group. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as well as the United
States, either the control group is small (five or fewer persons) or the
persons counted have material holdings (e.g., 10%). In Germany, Japan,
and the United Kingdom, however, there are no minimum shareholding
thresholds in determining whether resident shareholders own more than
50%, in the aggregate, of the foreign corporation.
Resident shareholders to whom income is attributed. Generally, there is
a 10% ownership threshold for income to be attributable to a shareholder
in the CFC.179 The threshold may be lower if the shareholder is part of a
177. BRIAN J. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1 (Canadian Tax Foundation 1986).
178. See OECD, CFC REPORT, supra note 171, at 127.
179. See, e.g., France, New Zealand.
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control group. 8'1 Application to the less than 10% shareholder is more
common as an element of the FIF regimes.
CFC income attributed to domestic taxpayers. In most CFC regimes
studied in the OECD CFC Report, the income subject to attribution is
analyzed on a transactional basis and consists of passive income, certain
related party or domestic income from sales or services and insurance
income.' 8 ' Some countries treat all income of a CFC as tainted, but rely
on exemptions to carve out active income. 182 New Zealand is the most
expansive. If the requisite control is found, all of the CFC's income is
included in the income of a New Zealand shareholder owning 10% or
more of the income interests in the CFC. Although New Zealand em-
ploys a list of countries to which the CFC rules do not apply, the list is
small and they all are high-tax countries. 8 3
3. Observations
The proposals set forth in this Article reflect an effort to define a prac-
tical taxing regime for which capital export neutrality is the predominant
objective. Although no country has adopted as strict an anti-deferral sys-
tem as proposed in Part IX of this Article, all of the material elements of
the proposed anti-deferral system may be found in at least one other
country's CFC regime.
B. FOREIGN INVESTMENT FUND LEGISLATION
The United States also is not alone in adopting anti-deferral legislation
relating to offshore investment companies. Although we have not under-
taken a survey of such legislation, we are aware that Germany and Aus-
tralia have such regimes. The following discussion outlines the German
foreign investment fund (FIF) taxation rules as a basis for comparison
with the U.S. PFIC rules.184
A FIF is a fund governed by non-German (foreign) law invested di-
rectly or indirectly in securities, securitized loans, cash deposits or real
property under the principle of risk diversification. The taxation rules
apply to the interests in a FIF, which will qualify as a foreign investment
unit (FIU). For tax purposes, FIUs are categorized as follows:
(i) Registered Units;
(ii) Units with respect to which a Tax Representative has been ap-
pointed (Tax Representative Units); and
180. See, e.g., Australia, Canada.
181. See, e.g., Australia, Canada.
182. See, e.g., France, Japan and United Kingdom.
183. In the United States, all the income of a CFC is treated as tainted base company
income if 70% or more of the CFC's income is foreign base company income. See I.R.C. §
954(b)(3)(B).
184. The description of the German rules is based on a paper prepared by Friedhelm
Jacob. See Friedhelm Jacob, Taxation of Income From Foreign Investment Units under the
German Foreign Investment Act (Dec. 5, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-




Registered Units are FIUs (i) registered for public distribution with the
German Federal Banking Supervisory Authority or (ii) traded on a Ger-
man stock exchange (but which are not distributed by way of public offer-
ing and with respect to which a Tax Representative 85 has been
appointed). 86 Profit distributions on Registered Units are taxable to a
German investor as dividends (if the investor is an individual who holds
the FIUs as a non-business asset) or as business income (in all other
cases). Realized but undistributed profits of the FIF are deemed distrib-
uted at the end of the fund's financial year and are taxable to an investor
as dividend income. In addition, certain accrued profits will be taxed as
dividends or business income, respectively, upon sale or redemption of
the FIUs. However, the investor's pro rata share of the fund's capital
gains is tax-exempt if the investor is an individual and holds the FIU as a
non-business asset.
Tax Representative Units are FlUs that are not Registered Units but
that meet certain requirements. A Tax Representative has to be ap-
pointed with respect to the FIUs. In addition, certain documentation re-
quirements have to be met that entail the calculation of interim profits on
a daily basis. Profit distributions on Tax Representative Units and real-
ized profits of the fund are taxable to the German investors as dividends.
Unlike Registered Units, no exemption applies to capital gains, which
therefore are taxed to the German investors at ordinary rates.
Other Units are units that do not qualify as Registered Units or as Tax
Representative Units. These Other Units are subject to an extremely on-
erous tax regime. The income derived from Other Units is determined by
adding 90% of their appreciation in value during the calendar year (but
not less than 10% of the redemption price last computed for the calendar
year) to the distributions actually made by the FIF. Thus, tax will be
imposed on the unrealized gains of the FIF, which, in addition, are
deemed to be at least 10% per annum of the redemption price. If Other
Units are redeemed or otherwise disposed of, 20% of the sales proceeds
is deemed income taxable at regular rates. Like the PFIC interest-charge
rules, the rules for Other Units discourage investment in a FIF that does
not issue Registered Units or Tax Representative Units.
The German FIF rules generally are comparable to the PFIC rules ex-
cept in one respect. The principal difference is that the use of an asset
test has swept far more than just investment companies into the PFIC net.
Like the PFIC rules, however, the German FIF regime applies to a Ger-
man resident shareholder no matter how small his, her or its shareholding
interest in the FIF. All of the income of the FIF is taxed (except realized
185. A Tax Representative is a German resident who is authorized to represent the
Fund before the German tax authorities and in the German tax courts.
186. In addition, the FIF has to fulfill notification and publication requirements and
certain data relevant for German tax purposes has to be reported to the investors. The
redemption value of the FlUs and certain profits accrued by the FIF have to be computed
and published on a daily basis.
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capital gains in the case of a holder of Registered Units) as dividends or
ordinary income.
V. THE MERITS OF DEVELOPING AN APPROACH TO
ENDING THE DEFERRAL SUBSIDY
Even those who believe that the deferral subsidy is appropriate should
recognize that legislation eliminating deferral is not an unreasonable pos-
sibility.187 Accordingly, it seems appropriate to think seriously about the
preferred technical approach for ending deferral, even though the policy
controversy concerning the desirability of deferral probably cannot be re-
solved. Furthermore, deferral is a topic that has long been on the reform
agenda. There has been extensive and continuous debate since 1961
(when President Kennedy proposed to end deferral for most CFCs).
Consequently, deferral advocates can participate in the present discussion
without concern that the mere development of a technical position would
likely be the event causing repeal of deferral. In addition, without articu-
lating with some clarity the design of a system for ending deferral, it is not
possible to accurately evaluate the costs and benefits of ending deferral
and the transition costs of moving to the new system for taxing income
earned by U.S. persons through foreign corporations.
VI. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AN ANTI-DEFERRAL
APPROACH AND AN EXPLANATION FOR PATHS NOT TAKEN
There are several ways to impose current U.S. tax on the foreign in-
come of CFCs, thereby ending the deferral subsidy. For example, an en-
tity level tax (collected from the U.S. shareholders) could be currently
levied on CFC income. Alternatively, if a U.S. corporation has at least
80% ownership of the CFC, the U.S. corporation could be required to file
a consolidated return with the CFC. Finally, a pass-through regime could
be imposed which requires U.S. shareholders to currently include their
shares of CFC income.
Choosing among these approaches and then designing a specific regime
under the chosen approach requires appropriate criteria. We suggest the
following. First, the Internal Revenue Code's foreign tax provisions are
already dauntingly complex. Thus, an anti-deferral regime should at least
be as simple as possible and, in a best-case scenario, should contribute to
reducing complexity.' 88
187. See LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, The Future of Deferral, in TAXING AMERICA 239
(Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996). Indeed, the demand by some taxpay-
ers to loosen the Subpart F deferral limitations because they are too complicated, see Ryan
J. Donmoyer, Multinationals Beg U.S. Senate Finance Committee to Simplify International
Laws, 18 TAX NOTES INT'L 1103 (1999), can be readily converted into a demand to elimi-
nate complexity by totally repealing deferral through the imposition of a pass-through re-
gime on CFCs. See infra Part IX.
188. For discussion of the possible simplification consequences of ending deferral, see
Charles 1. Kingson, Taxing the Future, 51 TAX L. REV. 641, 659-60 (1996).
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Second, if deferral is an evil that requires correction, the evil consists of
a tax subsidy, illustrated in Part II of this Article, that affirmatively en-
courages U.S. taxpayers to carry on business operations and investments
in low-tax foreign countries instead of in the United States. This subsidy
is present whether the foreign income is active or passive. Thus, there
seems to be no need for differential treatment of active and passive in-
come in a comprehensive anti-deferral regime. 89 Indeed, developing a
single approach to both types of income should promote the goal of
simplicity.
The third criterion is similar to the second. Since the deferral evil ex-
ists with respect to all foreign source income that is, in fact, earned by a
CFC in a low-tax jurisdiction, an anti-deferral regime has no need for
distinctions such as between CFC income that can readily be shifted to
low-tax jurisdictions and CFC income that is difficult to shift, 19 between
CFC income earned in the CFC's country of incorporation and CFC in-
come earned in another country,"'g between CFC income earned from
related party transactions and CFC income earned from independent par-
ties 192 and between manufacturing and service income. 93 In short, an
anti-deferral regime should reach all CFC income and should not leave
residual areas of deferral to be gamed by well-advised taxpayers.
Fourth, the purpose of an anti-deferral regime is fully served by taking
away the economic benefit of deferral; there is no need to impose puni-
tive consequences in addition. Furthermore, if U.S. shareholders were
faced with a punitive anti-deferral regime they could always avoid it by
conducting foreign operations through a foreign branch or pass-through
entity. These considerations suggest that to the extent that a CFC's for-
eign source income would have received preferential treatment under the
Code's capital gains provisions if earned through a foreign branch or
pass-through entity, the same preferential treatment should be available
to CFC income taxed under an anti-deferral system. Similarly, when
CFCs suffer net operating losses that would have been available to the
CFC's owners if it were a branch or pass-through entity, those losses
should be currently available to the CFC's U.S. shareholders. In addi-
tion, it is sufficient if foreign corporate earnings that are realized and rec-
ognized under existing general tax principles are taxed currently. The
formulation of an appropriate anti-deferral regime should not require sig-
189. See I.R.C. §§ 553, 954, 1297 (providing such treatment under current law). There
is no valid capital import neutrality or competitiveness argument justifying deferral with
respect to a passive investment.
190. The Subpart F income inclusions are sometimes described as focused on items that
can be readily shifted to low-tax countries. See, e.g., N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., supra
note 29, at 882; Treasury's Daniel Berman Reflects on Past and Future Int'l Tax Law, 76
TAX NOTES 1387, 1388 (1997); EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 AcT, supra note 50, at 963-65.
191. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(B), (e)(l)(B) (making such a distinction under current law).
192. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1), (e)(1)(A) (making such a distinction under current law).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4) (acknowledging that the Code's present CFC provi-
sions do not reach manufacturing income, whereas those provisions clearly apply to in-
come from resales of purchased personal property (I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)) and from
performing services (I.R.C. § 954(e))).
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nificant changes to the realization principle (however ill-advised that
principle may be from a tax policy point of view). Finally, these consider-
ations also indicate that an anti-deferral regime should employ tax rates
that reflect the tax rates of the CFC's U.S. owners.
When the preceding criteria are applied to an anti-deferral regime that
works by levying a current tax on the CFC, 19 4 the outcome is doubtful.
First, because the CFC is a foreign taxpayer and because the income that
is the object of such a tax is foreign-source, the tax could not be collected
from the CFC either practically or under prevailing international taxation
norms. 195 Instead, it would be necessary to collect from each U.S. share-
holder his, her, or its pro rata share of the tax imposed on the CFC. Fur-
thermore, the last of the preceding criteria would require the use of
shareholder rates in computing the tax borne by each U.S. shareholder.
In short, to make an entity-level tax workable and consistent with the
criteria described above, the tax has to be effectively transformed from an
entity-level tax into a pass-through regime. This suggests that the solu-
tion to the deferral problem lies in taxing CFC shareholders on a pass-
through basis. 196
Before we embrace the pass-through approach, however, we should at
least acknowledge the possibility of attacking deferral through mandatory
consolidated reporting.197 The deferral subsidy would be eliminated to
the extent that CFC income was currently taxed on a consolidated return
filed with a U.S. corporate parent. Furthermore, the CFC's income
would be taxed at the U.S. shareholder's rate, any capital gain characteri-
zation of the CFC's income would be preserved, CFC losses would be
currently available to the U.S. parent, and no distinction would be made
between active and passive income and other classes of income, all in
accordance with the design criteria developed above. Nevertheless, an
anti-deferral regime limited to consolidated return reporting by any CFC
and its 80%,198 or greater, U.S. corporate parent is highly problematic.
To be specific, this approach would violate the third of the preceding cri-
teria by leaving deferral intact for all CFCs that lack an 80% U.S. corpo-
rate parent. A large residual area of deferral would be preserved, and
194. For possible models, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New
Millennium, 51 TAX LAw. 229, 267-77 (1998); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39-60
(1992) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION REP.].
195. See Hugh J. Ault, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 371-73
(1997); ALl PROPOSALS, supra note 63, at 6; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP.,
supra note 51, at 49.
196. Of course, the difficulties in preventing the shares of business income from being
manipulated for tax purposes mean that pass-through taxation is not without problems.
See George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions
Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 139-58 (1997). But
the absence of entity-level taxation as a realistic alternative regime for CFCs makes the
problems of pass-through taxation more tolerable than they are in a purely domestic
context.
197. See Bhansali, supra note 3; Green, supra note 3, at 78.
198. See I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a).
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this would remain the case even if the stock ownership threshold for
mandatory consolidation were dropped as low as 50%.199 Stated differ-
ently, this cure would have only a modest impact on the disease.
It should also be noted that a commentator has recently suggested lim-
iting deferral by repealing Subpart F with respect to active business for-
eign income and replacing it with a system under which a CFC's United
States shareholders would be taxed annually on a deemed minimum dis-
tribution of the CFC's income for the year.21111 The proposal is somewhat
complex, but there is no need to describe the details here. It is sufficient
to say that if (1) the proposal's formula for calculating the minimum
deemed distribution produced an amount exactly equal to that which
would be included in the United States shareholders' incomes if the CFC
were a pass-through entity; (2) the character of the CFC's income, deduc-
tions, and credits were preserved in the hands of the United States share-
holders; and (3) CFC losses were available to the United States
shareholders, this proposal would amount to a de facto pass-through re-
gime. If, however, the deemed distribution was less than the amount cur-
rently taxable under a pass-through approach, then the deferral benefit
would be preserved pro tanto, and that is precisely what this particular
proposal envisions.201
Moreover, this recent proposal would violate the second of the preced-
ing criteria by requiring a distinction between active and passive in-
come,2°2 and the fourth by apparently declining to preserve the character
of CFC income that is deemed distributed to the United States sharehold-
ers,203 and by apparently failing to permit the pass-through of CFC
losses. 20 4 Finally, because the proposal would continue the Subpart F re-
gime with respect to most foreign personal holding company income, 20 5 it
would do little to simplify the law.
In contrast to the approach of levying a current U.S. tax on the CFC, to
the mandatory consolidated reporting regime and to the mandatory mini-
mum distribution system, a pass-through approach would fare well under
the four criteria described above. It would not distinguish between vari-
ous classes of income, the capital gains preference would apply, net oper-
ating losses would be currently available to U.S. shareholders, the CFC's
income would be taxed at its U.S. shareholders' rates, and most CFCs
would be covered by the system. It has, however, generally been thought
impractical to impose a pass-through tax regime on publicly traded cor-
199. This was Bhansali's proposal. See Bhansali, supra note 3, at 1410. To deal with the
residual area of deferral, he advocated that a CFC's minority shareholders be taxed on
their shares of CFC income pursuant to a pass-through regime. See id. at 1414-15.
200. See Stuart E. Leblang, Deferred Gratification: A More Rational Approach for Tax-
ing Multinationals, 81 TAx NorEs 1413 (1998).
201. See id. at 1419, 1421.
202. See id. at 1417-18.
203. See id. at 1423-24.
204. See id. at 1417-18, 1423-24.
205. See id. at 1417-18, 1422-24.
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porations.2o6 Thus, some other approach may be needed for the small
universe of publicly-traded CFCs. But because pass-through taxation is
the anti-deferral approach that best satisfies our design criteria, we shall
use it as a benchmark for evaluating the alternative proposals that follow
and for constructing our preferred approach.
VII. THE WRONG WAY TO END DEFERRAL FOR CFCS-
AN EXPANDED SUBPART F REGIME
The present CFC provisions require each U.S. person owning at least a
10% interest in a CFC (a "United States shareholder," as defined in sec-
tion 951(b)) to currently include his, her, or its pro rata share of certain
narrowly-defined categories of CFC income with respect to which defer-
ral was viewed as unduly egregious. The major income categories, and
the exceptions that narrow them, are:
1. Insurance income.2 07
There is an exception for insuring or reinsuring risks in the CFC's
country of incorporation. 20 8
2. Foreign personal holding company income209-i.e., "interest" 210 (in-
cluding OID,2 11 interest equivalent items 21 2 and "related person factoring
income" 213), royalties, rents, annuities, net gains from sales of passive in-
vestment property, 214 net gains from commodities transactions, 215 and
net foreign currency gains from section 988 transactions. 2 16 Although the
foreign personal holding company income category seems broadly inclu-
206. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION REP., supra note 194, at 33-35.
207. See I.R.C. §§ 952(a)(1), 953.
208. See I.R.C. § 953(a)(1) (prior to amendment by the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 Act]. Section 1005(b) of the 1998 Act effectively expanded this
exception to include the insuring and reinsuring of certain foreign cross-border risks and to
provide that income covered by this exception is not foreign base company services in-
come. See I.R.C. § 953(a), (e), 954(e)(2) (as amended in 1998). The 1998 Act also pro-
vided that insurance company investment income related to insuring or reinsuring these
foreign cross-border risks is generally excluded from foreign personal holding company
income and from foreign base company services income. See I.R.C. § 954(i), (c)(1)(B)(i),
(e)(2) (as amended in 1998). These provisions of the 1998 Act however, are applicable
only to tax years beginning in 1999, i.e., affected taxpayers can take advantage of the provi-
sions for only one year.
209. See I.R.C. §§ 952(a)(2), 954(a)(1). The 1998 Act amended the Internal Revenue
Code to provide that foreign income from the active conduct of a banking, financing, or
similar business is generally neither foreign personal holding company income nor foreign
base company services income. See 1.R.C. § 954(h), (c)(1)(B)(i), (e)(2) (as amended in
1998). These amendments, however, are applicable only to tax years beginning in 1999;
i.e., affected taxpayers can take advantage of the amendments for only one year. See gen-
erally LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, Good Subpart F News for Finance and Credit Companies,
81 TAX NOTES 901 (1998).
210. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(A).
211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(a)(4)(i).
212. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(E).
213. I.R.C. § 864(d).
214. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(B).
215. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C).
216. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(D).
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sive, it has the following important exceptions that would be targets of an
anti-deferral initiative.
i) Export financing interest exception: export financing interest de-
rived in the conduct of a banking business.21 7 This exception, however, is
inapplicable to related person factoring income. 218
ii) Related corporation/same country dividends and interest excep-
tion: dividends and interest received from a related corporation which is
incorporated in the same country as the CFC and which uses a substantial
part of its assets in its trade or business located in that country.219 This
exception is, however, inapplicable to interest to the extent that the inter-
est reduces the payor's Subpart F income or creates or increases an earn-
ings and profits deficit which, under section 952(c), may reduce the
Subpart F income of the payor or another CFC.220 In addition, this ex-
ception is inapplicable to section 881(c) portfolio interest, 221 and to re-
lated person factoring income. 222 Finally, this exception does not apply
to dividends on any stock attributable to earnings and profits accumu-
lated during any period in which the CFC did not directly hold the stock
or did not indirectly hold the stock through a chain of one or more same-
country subsidiaries. 223
iii) Related person factoring income/same country exception: this is
similar to the related corporation/same country dividend and interest ex-
ception, discussed above.2 24
iv) Related corporation/same country rents and royalties exception:
rents and royalties received from a related corporation for the use of, or
privilege of using, property within the CFC's country of incorporation. 225
This exception is inapplicable to rents and royalties to the extent that
they reduce the payor's Subpart F income 226 or create or increase an
earnings and profits deficit which, under section 952(c), may reduce the
Subpart F income of the payor or of another CFC.227
v) Active business/unrelated person rents and royalties exception:
rents and royalties received in the active conduct of a trade or business
from an unrelated person.22 8
vi) Net gains from sales of business property exception: the excess of
gains over losses from sales of tangible depreciable personal property,
real property, and intangibles used by the CFC in a business for the pro-
217. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(G).
218. See I.R.C. § 864(d)(5)(A)(iii).
219. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A)(i).
220. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(B).
221. See I.R.C. § 881(c)(5)(A)(iii).
222. See I.R.C. § 864(d)(5)(A)(iv).
223. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(C).
224. See I.R.C. § 864(d)(7).
225. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A)(ii).
226. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(B).
227. Id.
228. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(b)(6); see also GUSTAFSON, PER-
ON[ & PUGH, supra note 1, at 376.
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duction of income other than rents or royalties (except for active busi-
ness/unrelated person rents or royalties referred to in section
954(c)(2)(A)). 229
vii) Net gains from sales of dealer property and inventory exception:
net gains from the sale of section 1221(1) property.230
viii) Property dealer transactions exception: most income, gains, de-
ductions, and losses from all transactions of a CFC that is a regular dealer
in property if the transactions are entered into in the ordinary course of
the dealer business.23 1
ix) Commodities hedging transactions exception: net gains from bona
fide commodities hedging transactions reasonably necessary to the con-
duct of a commodities business. 232
x) Commodities business net gains exception: commodities sales net
gains which are active business net gains of a CFC substantially all the
business of which is as an active producer, processor, merchant, or han-
dler of commodities. 2 33
xi) Commodities business foreign currency gains and losses excep-
tion: commodities transactions gains and losses which are foreign cur-
rency gains and losses attributable to section 988 transactions.234
xii) Business related net foreign currency gains exception: other for-
eign currency net gains from section 988 transactions directly related to
the CFC's business needs.235
3. Foreign base company sales income-i.e., profits, commissions, fees,
and other income earned in connection with:
i) Sales of personal property. 236
ii) Purchases of personal property on behalf of a related person. 237
iii) Foreign milling of unprocessed softwood timber cut in the
United States. 238
The principal exceptions to this category of income are:
i) Manufactured property exception: sales of property manufac-
tured by the CFC239 except softwood timber cut in the United States and
milled abroad by the CFC.240
229. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(A), (B), (c)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(e)(1)(i)(A), (C),(e)(2)(i), (e)(3)(ii)-(iv).
230. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(B) (last sentence); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(e)(1)(ii).
231. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(2)(C).
232. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C)(i).
233. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C)(ii).
234. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C)(iii).
235. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(D).
236. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1) (first paragraph).
237. See id.
238. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(4).
239. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4); Eric T. Laity, The Foreign Base Company Sales
Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93, 107 (1998) [herein-
after Laity, Foreign Base Company Sales Income]; Adess, Angus & Villmow, supra note 23,
at 936-37.




ii) Unrelated party exception: purchases and sales of personal prop-
erty where all parties are unrelated to the CFC,241 sales of personal prop-
erty on behalf of unrelated persons242 and purchases of personal property
on behalf of unrelated persons.243 But this exception is inapplicable
where the sold property is unprocessed softwood timber cut in the United
States.244
iii) Same country production exception: purchases and sales of per-
sonal property, sales of personal property on behalf of another, and
purchases of personal property on behalf of another where the property
in question is manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the CFC's
country of incorporation. 245 This exception does not apply to un-
processed softwood timber cut in the United States and milled in the
CFC's country of incorporation. 246
iv) Same country use exception: purchases and sales of personal
property, sales of personal property on behalf of another, and purchases
of personal property on behalf of another where the property in question
is to be used, consumed, or disposed of in the CFC's country of incorpo-
ration.247 This exception does not apply to sales of unprocessed softwood
timber cut in the United States and sales or purchases of such timber
milled outside the United States.248
v) Noncompetitive agricultural commodities exception: purchases
and sales of personal property, sales of personal property on behalf of
another, and purchases of personal property on behalf of another where
the property in question is an agricultural commodity not grown in the
United States in commercially marketable quantities.249
4. Foreign base company services income-i.e., compensation earned
by a CFC "in connection with the performance of technical, managerial,
engineering, architectural, scientific, skilled, industrial, commercial, or
like services. ' '25°
The principal exceptions to this category of income are:
i) Unrelated person exception: compensation for services rendered
to or on behalf of an unrelated person. 251
ii) Same country exception: compensation for services rendered in
the CFC's country of incorporation. 252
241. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(4).
245. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(l)(A); Laity, Foreign Base Company Sales Income, supra note
239, at 129-30.
246. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(4).
247. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(B).
248. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(4).
249. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1) (last flush paragraph).
250. I.R.C. § 954(e)(1) (first paragraph).
251. See I.R.C. § 954(e)(1)(A).
252. See I.R.C. § 954(e)(1)(B).
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iii) Sales related services: compensation for presale services directly
related to the CFC's sale "of property manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted by it"253 and compensation for services directly related to an
offer or attempt to sell such property. 254
Deferral would be substantially curtailed by repealing the same coun-
try, manufactured property, and unrelated person exceptions described
above, and deferral would be virtually eliminated by repealing all excep-
tions described above. 255 Moreover, either of these alternatives would
achieve the reduction or elimination of deferral without creating any new
statutory structure; both alternatives would make use of the familiar con-
structive dividend structure of section 951(a) but would substantially
broaden the items that are included in constructive dividend treatment.
Furthermore, they would deal with both active income and passive in-
come (at least to the extent that passive income is included in foreign
personal holding company income) without creating complex differentials
in the treatment of these two categories. Finally, both of these alterna-
tives would serve the goal of simplification by permitting the repeal of
sections 956 and 1248.256
But this approach would have several unattractive features. First, it
would leave the various Subpart F income categories and the section
954(b)(5) deduction allocation rules in place. Second, the indirect foreign
tax credit in section 960 for foreign income tax paid by the CFC would
not be available to individual shareholders unless they elect to be taxed
as corporations on their CFC constructive dividends.2 57 Third, the com-
plexities of the indirect foreign tax credit provisions in sections 960 and
902 would be preserved as the rules for passing foreign taxes paid by the
CFC through to the CFC shareholders. Fourth, the character of the
passed-through income items would generally not be preserved.258 This
is important with respect to long-term capital gains passed through to
individual shareholders principally because of the rate preference for
those gains. It will also be important to corporate shareholders if a cor-
porate capital gain preference is adopted. Even if this does not happen,
corporations may find capital gains advantageous because they absorb
otherwise nondeductible capital losses.
Finally, CFC losses are not passed through to shareholders under the
present CFC provisions.259 Instead, CFC losses are carried forward as
earnings and profits deficits and used to reduce Subpart F income in sub-
sequent years (subject to the section 952(c)(2) recharacterization rule),
but only Subpart F income produced by the same class of activity as the
class of activity that gave rise to the loss. All of this substantially reduces
253. I.R.C. § 954(e)(2)(A).
254. See I.R.C. § 954(e)(2)(B).
255. See Green, supra note 3, at 75-77.
256. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 51, at 48.
257. See 1.R.C. §§ 960, 962.
258. Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1(a).
259. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.954-1(c)(1)(ii), -2(e)(1)(iii).
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the value of CFC losses to CFC shareholders by deferring the economic
benefit of the losses. This distortion would be preserved by an anti-defer-
ral regime that relies on the current Subpart F framework. 26"
In short, curtailing or ending deferral for CFCs by expanding the defi-
nition of Subpart F income would result in a very complex anti-deferral
regime with unsatisfactory limitations on pass-through treatment for the
CFC's United States shareholders.
Recently, a commentator has proposed curtailing deferral by adding a
"low-tax-kick-in" to Subpart F.26 1 Under this proposal, all CFC income
that is deferred under current Subpart F would lose the deferral benefit if
it were not currently taxed in a foreign jurisdiction at 90% or more of the
section 11 rate.262 Although the details have not been elaborated, this
proposal would seem to retain much of the current Subpart F structure
and, therefore, be subject to the criticisms directed above at the proposal
to end deferral by repealing the Subpart F income exceptions. Further-
more, the "low-tax-kick-in" proposal assumes that objections to the
deferral subsidy will vanish if deferred income is taxed abroad at 90% of
the U.S. rate but not at a lower foreign rate, say 85% of the U.S. rate. It
seems highly doubtful that a precise determination can be made regard-
ing the foreign rate point at which the deferral advantage becomes insig-
nificant and, more importantly, it seems doubtful that the effort is worth
the trouble. Indeed, the author of the "low-tax-kick-in proposal" is cer-
tainly aware of these criticisms because he offered the proposal as a sec-
ond-best alternative to his preferred approach of terminating deferral
altogether.263
VIII. ANOTHER SUBOPTIMAL WAY TO END DEFERRAL-
THE ROSTENKOWSKI-GRADISON BILL
The Rostenkowski-Gradison bill was introduced in the House in 1992
as H.R. 5270,264 but it died at the end of the session. 265 It would have
260. See Shay, supra note 3. at 1061.
261. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, 79 TAX
NOTES 1775 (1998) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Logic of Subpart F]; see also Albertina M.
Fernandez, Jacqueline B. Manasterli, Amy Hamilton & Kathleen Matthews, IRS, GW
Hold Annual International Tax Institute, 81 TAX NOTES 1467, 1474-76 (1998); U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 51, at 12. For a different critique of Professor Avi-
Yonah's proposal, see David P. Hariton, The 'Logic' of Subpart F. Response to Prof Avi-
Yonah, 79 TAX NOTES 1778 (1998). Professor Avi-Yonah, in turn, responds to this critique
in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, More on U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F, 16 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1943 (1998).
262. See Avi-Yonah, Logic of Subpart F, supra note 261, at 1777.
263. See id. at 1777 n.20.; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 102D CONG., 2D
SEss., EXPLANATION OF H.R. 5270 (FOREIGN INCOME TAX RATIONALIZATION AND SIM-
PLIFICATION ACT OF 1992) (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter RATIONALIZATION AND SIM-
PLIFICATION ACT].
264. H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). For analyses of H.R. 5270, see U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 51, at 48; RATIONALIZATION AND SIMPLIFICA-
TION ACT, supra note 263.
265. See generally Barbara Kirchheimer, Foreign Tax Bill Floats in a Sea of Lukewarm
Reviews, 55 TAX NOTES 1303 (1992); Ian K. Louden, Rosty, Gradison Introduce Sweeping
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ended deferral by treating all of a CFC's earnings and profits as Subpart
F income. The exclusion in present section 952(b), regarding U.S. source
income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business of the CFC,
would have been continued, however.
This approach would have accomplished substantial simplification by
eliminating the present Subpart F income categories and the exceptions
thereto. However, the constructive dividend structure of section 951(a)
would have been continued. Thus, the character of CFC income taxed to
CFC shareholders generally would not have been preserved. Further-
more, the complexities of the indirect foreign tax credit provisions in sec-
tions 960 and 902 would have continued to govern the pass-through to
domestic corporate CFC shareholders of foreign taxes paid by CFCs.
Also, the section 960 indirect foreign tax credit would have continued to
be unavailable to individual shareholders unless they elected to be taxed
as corporations on their CFC constructive dividends. Finally, CFC losses
would have continued to be carried forward as earnings and profits defi-
cits of the CFC instead of being passed through to CFC shareholders.
However, there would have been a repeal of the rule specifying that a
deficit can be used to absorb only Subpart F income produced by the
same activity that gave rise to the loss. This modification would have
made the loss carryforward rule slightly less onerous and complex.
In summary, the Rostenkowski-Gradison Bill was an improvement on
the expanded Subpart F approach described above in that it would have
eliminated the intricate Subpart F income categories and the exceptions
thereto. Nevertheless, considerable complexity would have remained,
the character of CFC income would not have been passed through to
CFC shareholders, and CFC losses would not have been passed through
to CFC shareholders. The latter two of these consequences seem incon-
sistent with a regime that currently taxes CFC shareholders on their pro
rata portions of CFC income.
IX. THE RIGHT WAY TO END DEFERRAL-TREATMENT OF
THE FOREIGN CORPORATION AS A PASS-THROUGH ENTITY
WITH RESPECT TO ITS U.S. SHAREHOLDERS 266
A. INTRODUCTION
As discussed above in Parts II and III of this Article, the complex array
of anti-deferral regimes of current law represents an uneasy and impracti-
cal compromise between completely ending deferral of U.S. tax on in-
come earned by U.S. persons through foreign corporations and allowing
such deferral without limitation. Congress has made numerous revisions
Foreign Tax Simplification Bill, 55 TAx NOTES 1161 (1992); Joanna Richardson, Gains
From Foreign Tax Bill Not Worth Losses, Witnesses Charge, 56 TAx NOTES 397 (1992);
John Turro, OECD Ambassadors Protest Foreign Tax Bill, 56 TAx NOTES 554 (1992).
266. Part IX of this Article is drawn in part from an earlier article by Robert J. Peroni,
Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax
Rules, 51 U. MIAMi L. REV. 975, 986-94 (1997).
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to the anti-deferral regimes over the years and has changed directions
several times in terms of strengthening or weakening those regimes.
These revisions have only made the U.S. international tax system more
complex without significantly eliminating the problems caused by the
deferral privilege. The end product of this legislative ineffectiveness is a
highly complicated set of statutory provisions that leaves the deferral sub-
sidy largely intact, thus encouraging U.S. taxpayers to shift their opera-
tions abroad to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, but requiring that a taxpayer
navigate through a number of anti-deferral hurdles to obtain that result.
Moreover, the current rules make deferral elective for the well-advised
U.S. taxpayer and create traps for the unwary in the case of other U.S.
taxpayers, thus undermining taxpayer confidence in the fairness and effi-
ciency of the tax system. 26 7 One could well argue that the current system
is more complicated, susceptible of tax abuse, and economically ineffi-
cient than a "theoretically pure" territorial system of taxing foreign
source income, which would exclude foreign source income from U.S.
taxation but not allow the deduction of any foreign source losses nor al-
low any credit for foreign taxes.268
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE PASS-THROUGH PROPOSAL
Given the inherent problems with the expanded Subpart F approach
for curtailing deferral by CFCs (detailed above in Part VII of this Article)
and with the Rostenkowski-Gradison approach for eliminating deferral
outlined above in Part VIII, a more effective method for ending deferral
would be to treat each U.S. person2 69 (including a U.S. multinational cor-
poration) owning stock in a foreign corporation (regardless of whether
the foreign corporation is a CFC as defined in section 957) as if that
shareholder directly earned his, her, or its pro rata share of the foreign
267. As numerous other commentators have noted, the elective nature of the deferral
privilege has been fortified and made more explicit by the Treasury Department's adoption
of the "check-the-box" entity classification system. See T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215. Under
the check-the-box classification system, U.S. persons operating abroad through foreign en-
tities (other than per se foreign corporations) are more readily able to elect whether to
obtain deferral of U.S. tax on their foreign source income by electing whether to have the
foreign entities treated as corporations or partnerships (or disregarded as an entity sepa-
rate from its owner in the case of an entity with a single owner) for tax purposes. See, e.g.,
Avi-Yonah, End Deferral, supra note 3; Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed
"Check-the-Box" Regulations, 71 TAX NOTES 1679 (1996). For example, a U.S. taxpayer is
likely to elect partnership or branch (i.e., disregarded entity) status for a subsidiary en-
gaged in foreign operations that are generating losses, or for a subsidiary operating in a
high-tax foreign country because the U.S. taxpayer can use the foreign tax credit to offset
both the U.S. tax on the subsidiary's foreign source income and the U.S. tax on other low-
taxed foreign source income earned by the U.S. taxpayer in other countries. (The latter
planning strategy works only when the high-taxed and low-taxed foreign source income
falls within the same basket limitation category in section 904(d)(1). See, e.g., GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 1, at 293-94, 301,471-72.) In addition, a U.S. taxpayer is likely
to elect partnership or branch status for foreign subsidiaries in situations where flow-
through status will circumvent certain restrictions and limitations on the foreign tax credit
under current law. See Schler, supra, at 1687.
268. The articulation of this argument will itself, however, require a separate full article.
269. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30).
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corporation's gross income and expenses. Under this pass-through ap-
proach, each U.S. person owning stock in the foreign corporation would
be required to currently include a pro rata share of such income or ex-
pense in computing his, her, or its own U.S. tax liability. Thus, deferral
would be ended with respect to the U.S. shareholders' full shares of all of
the foreign corporation's income, not merely certain categories of income
earned by CFCs described in section 957 (as is true under Subpart F of
current law). In addition, each U.S. person owning stock in a foreign
corporation would be attributed his, her, or its share of the foreign taxes
paid by the corporation during the year and could claim a direct credit for
those taxes, to the extent they are creditable taxes under section 901 or
section 903 and subject to the limitations in section 904.
Under this pass-through regime, a U.S. person owning stock in a for-
eign corporation would be allowed to reduce his, her, or its taxable in-
come by a pro rata share of the foreign corporation's losses.270 This
feature of the proposed pass-through regime would remove the bias that
exists under current law against use of the corporate form in international
start-up situations where significant deductions in excess of income in the
early years of a venture are anticipated.
Other important features of this pass-through regime include the
following:
1. The character of the foreign corporation's items of income and ex-
pense would flow through to the U.S. shareholders under principles simi-
lar to those developed under section 702(b) of Subchapter K and 1366(b)
of Subchapter S. Thus, the character distortion caused by Subpart F's
constructive dividend approach to curtailing deferral (under which all
Subpart F income attributed to a U.S. shareholder is treated as ordinary
income) would be avoided with this pass-through regime.
2. To determine each U.S. shareholder's pro rata share of the foreign
corporation's income, losses, and foreign taxes, pass-through rules similar
to those developed under Subchapter K would apply in modified form.
All such allocations would have to survive the "substantial economic ef-
fect" test of section 704(b).271
Alternatively, one could adopt a principle for determining a U.S. share-
holder's pro rata share of the foreign corporation's income, expenses, and
taxes that does not allow contractual special allocations of such items to
be determinative (notwithstanding their passing muster under the section
704(b) regulations). Under this alternative approach, a U.S. share-
270. In the case of tiered structures of corporations, look-through rules may be needed
to the extent that section 958 does not solve the problem.
271. Simplification and reform of the allocation rules in Subchapter K are needed with-
out regard to whether this pass-through proposal is ever enacted into law. The tax abuses
and economic inefficiencies fostered by the allocation rules in Subchapter K have been the
subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Spe-
cial Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1 (1990); Kwall, supra note 194, at 232, 248-53, 268-70.
Moreover, the American Law Institute will soon release a draft of its study of those rules
and its proposals for their reform. In any event, a detailed discussion of the Subchapter K
allocation rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
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holder's pro rata share of the foreign corporation's income, expenses, and
taxes would correspond to the shareholder's economic interest in the cor-
poration. In determining the U.S. shareholder's economic interest in the
foreign corporation, one could look primarily at three factors: (1) the
shareholder's voting rights in the corporation; (2) the shareholder's right
to participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the
shareholder's right to share in the corporation's net assets on liquida-
tion. 272 There are, however, two major problems with this alternative ap-
proach for determining a U.S. shareholder's share of the foreign
corporation's items of income, expense, and taxes. First, in a case where
there are multiple classes of stock with differing voting rights, dividend
rights, and liquidation preferences, it may be very difficult, as a practical
matter, for the U.S. shareholder to determine his, her or its economic
interest in the foreign corporation. Second, by ignoring special alloca-
tions if a foreign corporation is used to conduct the foreign business, but
continuing to respect such allocations if a partnership or LLC is used, the
same choice of entity distortions induced by the special allocation rules in
the partnership area under current law would be perpetuated by our pass-
through proposal.
3. Basis adjustments similar to those in both section 705 of Subchapter
K and section 1367 of Subchapter S would apply to prevent double taxa-
tion of the foreign corporation's earnings when they are distributed to a
U.S. shareholder or a U.S. shareholder sells the corporation's stock.
Thus, for example, items of income that flow through to the U.S. share-
holders would increase those shareholders' bases in their stock in the for-
eign corporation, and deductions or losses flowing through to the U.S.
shareholders would reduce their stock bases. Distributions to the U.S.
shareholders would reduce their bases in the corporation's stock.
4. Any losses flowing through from the foreign corporation to a U.S.
person owning stock in the corporation would be limited to the extent of
the U.S. shareholder's basis in the corporation's stock and the U.S. share-
holder's basis in any loans to the foreign corporation. This loss limitation
rule is analogous to the section 704(d) limit on the deduction of partner-
ship losses and the section 1366(d)(1)(A) limit on the deduction of S cor-
poration losses.2 73
272. These are the factors looked at by the IRS and the courts in determining whether a
shareholder is entitled to exchange treatment on a corporate redemption under section
302(b)(1) by reason of the redemption resulting in a meaningful reduction in the share-
holder's proportionate interest in the corporation. See, e.g., Roebling v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 16, 30 (1981); Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92; Rev.
Rul. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127. See generally BORIS I. BIrTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.05131 (6th ed.
1994).
273. Under this pass-through proposal, a decision would have to be made concerning
whether the Subchapter K approach to treatment of entity-level liabilities to third parties
will be followed. in other words, should a U.S. shareholder be allowed to include a pro
rata share of the foreign corporation's liabilities in his, her, or its adjusted basis in the stock
for purposes of the limitation on a shareholder's deduction of losses flowing through from
the corporation and the taxability of dividend distributions to the shareholder? If so, this
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5. Distributions from the foreign corporation would be tax-free to the
extent of the shareholder's basis in the corporation's stock. Any distribu-
tions in excess of stock basis would be treated as gain from the sale of the
corporation's stock. 274
Suppose that the U.S. person owning stock in the foreign corporation
does not have sufficient information to determine his, her, or its pro rata
share of the corporation's income, either because the shareholder owns a
small percentage of stock in a closely held foreign corporation that is
otherwise owned by uncooperative foreign persons or the shareholder
owns a small percentage of stock in a publicly traded foreign corporation
that is indifferent to the information needs of shareholders under U.S. tax
law. As a practical matter, how would such a U.S. person determine his,
her, or its pro rata share of the foreign corporation's income and ex-
penses? What accommodations can be made in the pass-through regime
to reflect these compliance concerns?
If the foreign corporation's stock is publicly traded, the U.S. person
could be provided with a mark-to-market election similar to the one pro-
vided in section 1296 of current law with respect to passive foreign invest-
ment companies. The mechanics of this mark-to-market approach would
be similar to those in section 1296.
Alternatively, if the U.S. person owns a less than 10% stock interest in
the voting power of a foreign corporation the stock of which is not pub-
licly traded, the U.S. shareholder could be allowed to base the amount of
the current inclusion on generally available financial information of the
corporation, with adjustments to reflect U.S. tax accounting principles for
certain "material items" that could be "reasonably identified" by the U.S.
person.275 The reason that we would limit this alternative reporting ap-
proach to less than 10% shareholders is that, as a practical matter, a U.S.
person owning 10% or more of the voting power of a foreign corporation
should have sufficient economic clout to obtain the necessary information
concerning the foreign corporation's income and deductions to report
under the general pass-through approach.276 In determining whether a
pass-through proposal would place great pressure on the liability allocation rules in Sub-
chapter K and would require that those rules be carefully reexamined and reformulated.
Alternatively, a more sound approach might be to adopt the Subchapter S model here and
not allow the U.S. shareholder to include a pro rata share of the foreign corporation's
liabilities to third parties in the stock basis for loss limitation purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 1366(d) (allowing a shareholder of an S corporation to deduct losses flowing through
from the corporation only to the extent of the shareholder's basis in the S corporation
stock and in any indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder). However, this
latter approach would perpetuate a choice of entity bias in favor of the partnership form of
conducting a foreign business if the business is expected to incur losses and will be financed
with third-party debt incurred by the entity.
274. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(3), 1368(b)(2).
275. See Shay, supra note 3, at 1061.
276. This premise is consistent with the assumption underlying both the indirect credit
provisions in sections 902 and 960 and the look-through rules used for foreign tax credit
limitation purposes in sections 904(d)(3) and 904(d)(4) that 10% or more U.S. sharehold-
ers in foreign corporations are able to obtain detailed information concerning a foreign
corporation's income, deductions, and foreign taxes.
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U.S. person is a 10% or more shareholder in the foreign corporation for
this purpose, a modified version of the foreign entity indirect ownership
and constructive ownership rules in section 958 would apply.
We recognize, however, that there may be a number of situations
where the less than 10% U.S. shareholders of a nonpublicly traded for-
eign corporation do not possess sufficient financial information concern-
ing the foreign corporation to properly report their income under the
pass-through method, even as modified to use financial accounting infor-
mation. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to use a modified version of
the approach taken in section 1291 of the current law PFIC provisions-
namely, allow such less than 10% U.S. shareholders to defer U.S. tax on
their shares of the foreign corporation's income but recapture the bene-
fits of deferral by imposing an interest charge when the U.S. shareholder
receives an extraordinary distribution (i.e., an "excess distribution") from
the corporation or the U.S. shareholder sells the foreign corporation's
stock. However, in calculating that interest charge on the benefit of
deferral, we would not use the straight-line accrual calculation method of
section 1291, which calculates the interest charge by allocating the tax-
payer's income realized at the time of an excess distribution or sale of the
PFIC's stock over the shareholder's entire holding period for the stock on
a ratable or straight-line basis. We would not use that method because it
assumes more tax deferral than would occur if income had been earned at
a constant rate (i.e., it "front-loads" the deferred income) and thus proba-
bly over-compensates for the benefits of deferral in most cases.2 77 In-
stead, we would calculate the interest charge by using economic accrual
and assuming that the undistributed income had been earned at a con-
stant rate.
C. SIMPLIFICATION AND OTHER BENEFITS OF THE
PASS-THROUGH PROPOSAL
Adoption of this pass-through method for ending deferral by U.S. per-
sons earning foreign source income through foreign corporations should
result in significant simplification and reform of various international tax
provisions of the Code. First, the detailed rules in sections 952 through
954 (and the regulations promulgated thereunder) defining the various
types of Subpart F income (and the exceptions thereto) would be unnec-
essary and would be repealed. As discussed earlier in this Article, there
is little policy justification for the lines drawn in the Subpart F regime of
current law between acceptable and unacceptable deferral opportunities.
Accordingly, our pass-through proposal would end deferral completely
without regard to the type of income earned by the foreign corporation.
Second, the definitions of "United States shareholder" in section
951(b) and "controlled foreign corporation" in section 957 would be un-
277. See Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52
TAX L. REV. 45, 65, 67 (1996); see also, e.g., 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 12, at 1 44.16.
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necessary in a pass-through regime that ends deferral completely for U.S.
persons owning stock in foreign corporations and would be repealed.
Under the proposed pass-through regime, all U.S. persons owning stock
in a foreign corporation would be required to include their pro rata
shares of the corporation's income and deductions on their own returns,
regardless of the level of U.S. ownership of the foreign corporation. Our
theory is that the deferral incentive for income earned through foreign
corporations is no more justifiable for 1% U.S. shareholders in a foreign
corporation than it is for 25% U.S. shareholders. One reason for drawing
the line at 10%-the presumed lack of power to compel dividend distri-
butions by the foreign corporation when the shareholder owns less than
10%-does not withstand scrutiny. A 1% owner of a partnership interest
may not be able to force distributions by the entity; yet, U.S. tax law
requires the partner to report his, her, or its distributive share of the part-
nership's net income and leaves the partner with the burden of solving
any liquidity problem by negotiating an appropriate distribution provi-
sion in the partnership agreement. There is, however, a genuine concern
regarding whether the 1% shareholder can obtain sufficient information
to make an accurate return under the pass-through approach, and we
have dealt with that concern by providing an alternative reporting
method for under 10% shareholders of non-publicly traded foreign cor-
porations.278 Note that the foreign entity indirect ownership rules in sec-
tion 958(a), and the constructive ownership rules in section 958(b) would
be simplified and retained only for purposes of the special reporting
method for less than 10% U.S. shareholders outlined above.
Third, the policy rationales underlying sections 956 and 1248 would no
longer be valid in a pass-through regime ending deferral completely for
U.S. persons owning stock in a foreign corporation. Accordingly, both of
those complicated provisions could be repealed. In addition to this sim-
plification benefit, unrepatriated low-taxed foreign earnings would no
longer be "trapped" in foreign corporation solution. Today, literally
many corporations have millions of dollars of unrepatriated earnings that
are reinvested outside the United States to take advantage of the deferral
incentive.279 In certain cases, the consequence of the deferral incentive is
a tax-induced distortion of the decision of where to invest these funds.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 275-277.
279. See infra text accompanying notes 310-311. For example, Intel Corporation's 1997
annual report on Form 10-K reports that it has not paid U.S. income taxes on $1.5 billion of
undistributed earnings for certain non-U.S. subsidiaries and intends to reinvest these earn-
ings indefinitely in operations outside the United States. A few examples from other 1998
annual reports indicate that U.S. taxes have not been paid on $2.4 billion of earnings from
Lucent Technologies' foreign subsidiaries and $6.7 billion of earnings from Procter &
Gamble's foreign subsidiaries. Not all unrepatriated earnings are being held offshore to
defer tax. The 1998 annual report for the Hewlett-Packard Company, for example, reports
that the company has not paid U.S. taxes on $7.1 billion of foreign subsidiaries' unrepa-
triated earnings but goes on to state that if these earnings were distributed foreign tax
credits should become available to offset the resulting U.S. tax.
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Fourth, the indirect foreign tax credit provisions in sections 902 and 960
would be repealed, at least with respect to post-enactment earnings of
foreign corporations. Each U.S. person owning stock in the foreign cor-
poration (including a U.S. individual) would obtain a direct credit for his,
her, or its pro rata shares of the creditable foreign taxes paid by the cor-
poration; thus, no indirect credit would be necessary. This change also
would permit repeal of the election in section 962 for an individual share-
holder of a controlled foreign corporation to be taxed as a corporation.
Moreover, adoption of our pass-through proposal should permit substan-
tial simplification of the foreign tax credit limitation rules in section 904.
Fifth, if this pass-through proposal were adopted, the passive foreign
investment company provisions, the foreign personal holding company
provisions and the foreign investment company provisions of current law
would no longer be necessary and could be repealed. Moreover, the per-
sonal holding company tax provisions and accumulated earnings tax pro-
visions could be amended to exempt foreign corporations from their
reach. Instead of six overlapping and ineffective anti-deferral regimes,
only one anti-deferral regime would remain-the pass-through regime
which ends deferral entirely for U.S. persons earning income through for-
eign corporations.
Sixth, the number of outbound transfer pricing disputes under section
482 should be significantly reduced, thereby lowering taxpayer compli-
ance costs and IRS administration costs.28 0 The deferral subsidy encour-
ages U.S. multinational corporations to use intercompany pricing to shift
profits to their controlled foreign corporations operating in tax haven ju-
risdictions. This pass-through proposal would make such shifts an inef-
fective tax planning strategy since the profits would be subject to a
current U.S. tax in the hands of the U.S. multinational owning stock in
the foreign corporation.
Seventh, repeal of deferral should significantly reduce pressure on the
section 367 rules, which in part serve as a backstop to the current anti-
deferral regimes in the Code. Thus, repeal of deferral through the adop-
tion of this pass-through proposal should permit substantial simplification
of those increasingly complex and incoherent rules.281
Eighth, repeal of deferral would permit adoption of the worldwide fun-
gibility method of interest allocation for U.S. multinationals and their
U.S. and foreign affiliates.282 This approach to interest allocation would
both simplify the international tax rules and improve economic efficiency
280. See Shay, supra note 3, at 1062.
281. See id.
282. Ending deferral would offset one of the major arguments against adoption of the
worldwide fungibility method of interest allocation-namely, that worldwide fungibility is
not appropriate when the foreign income of a U.S. multinational group is not subject to
current U.S. tax by reason of the deferral privilege because it allows a double tax benefit to
the U.S. parent corporation (i.e., deferral of U.S. tax on the foreign income of its foreign
subsidiaries and a deduction for interest expense allocable to such income). See U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 51, at 38 n.89.
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by reducing the effect of tax considerations in the financing decisions of
U.S. multinational corporations and their affiliates. 283 By contrast, the
so-called "water's edge fungibility" interest allocation approach of cur-
rent law causes a U.S. multinational corporation to borrow through its
foreign subsidiaries (and thereby reduce the amount of interest expense
allocable to the U.S. parent's foreign source income), even when borrow-
ing through a U.S. financing subsidiary would be less costly from a nontax
perspective.284
Finally, adoption of this anti-deferral proposal should greatly reduce
the significance of tax considerations in a U.S. person's choice of an en-
tity to conduct international business and investment activities because all
foreign business entities, whether corporations, partnerships or branches,
would be taxed under a pass-through approach.
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE PASS-THROUGH PROPOSAL
There are a number of problems with this pass-through proposal for
ending deferral, which would require further analysis before this proposal
were enacted.285 First and foremost, as discussed below in Part X of this
Article, adoption of this proposal would involve complicated transition
issues, which would require either the retention of many of the provisions
of current law with respect to pre-enactment foreign corporate earnings
(e.g., sections 902, 960, and 1248) or the adoption of other alternative
transitional approaches (each of which has its own problems). Second, as
the Subchapter K provisions of current law demonstrate, rules for allocat-
ing the source and character of the income and expenses of a pass-
through entity to its owners are complex in operation. Adoption of this
proposal would undoubtedly put great pressure on those allocation rules
and raise many new issues concerning their application. 286
However, whatever added complexity would be caused by extension of
pass-through rules to all U.S. persons owning stock in foreign corpora-
tions is outweighed by the simplification benefits achieved by the propo-
sal, as discussed above. In any event, with the adoption of the explicitly
elective, check-the-box entity classification system, a substantial exten-
sion of the application of the pass-through rules to U.S. persons owning
interests in foreign entities is inevitable since more U.S. taxpayers are
likely to be operating abroad through foreign entities that will be classi-
fied as partnerships or "tax nothings" for federal tax purposes, even
283. See id. at 36-39.
284. See id. at 38.
285. In addition to those problems raised in the text, some commentators, including one
of the authors of this Article, see Peroni, supra note 266, at 989 n.36, believe that adoption
of this pass-through proposal might require renegotiation of existing U.S. income tax trea-
ties in order to avoid a "treaty override" problem. However, the other two authors of this
Article believe that the pass-through proposal is consistent with existing U.S. tax treaties.
See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 173, at 122. In any event, we believe
that the United States should seek to develop an international consensus for repealing tax
deferral on the foreign income of CFCs.
286. See Peroni, supra note 266, at 992-93.
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though those entities provide limited liability for investors. Thus, adop-
tion of the check-the-box entity classification system should necessarily
provoke a rethinking and redesign of the Subchapter K allocation rules.
These rules were largely designed for a different era, not an era in which
partnership flow-through treatment for a variety of different types of
business organization (including the limited liability company) have be-
come widely used for both domestic and foreign activities. 287
E. NARROWER VERSION OF PASS-THROUGH PROPOSAL THAT WOULD
APPLY ONLY TO "UNITED STATES SHAREHOLDERS" OF
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Alternatively, a narrower version of this proposal could be adopted,
which would require only United States shareholders (as defined in sec-
tion 951(b)) of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) (as defined in sec-
tion 957) to report their pro rata shares of the CFC's income and
deductions on their own returns. 28 8 This narrower version would achieve
a substantial expansion of the reach of the anti-deferral rules, but at a
lesser cost in terms of administrative difficulties.
Under this narrower version of the anti-deferral proposal:
1. Each United States shareholder of the CFC would be required to
currently include a pro rata share of the CFC's income and expense items
in computing his/her/its own U.S. tax liability.
2. Each United States shareholder of the CFC would be attributed
his/her/its share of the foreign taxes paid by the CFC during the year and
could claim a direct credit for those taxes to the extent they are creditable
taxes under section 901 or section 903 (subject to the limit in section 904).
3. Under this pass-through regime, a United States shareholder of a
CFC (including a U.S. multinational corporation) would be allowed to
reduce its taxable income by its pro rata share of the CFC's losses.
4. The character of the CFC's items of income and expense would
flow through to the United States shareholders under rules similar to
those developed under sections 702(b) and 1366(b).
5. To determine each United States shareholder's pro rata share of
the CFC's income, losses, and foreign taxes, pass-through rules similar to
those developed under Subchapter K would apply in modified form. As
discussed above, any allocations of the CFC's income, losses, and foreign
taxes would have to meet the substantial economic effect test of section
704(b) and the regulations thereunder.
6. Basis adjustments similar to those in sections 705 and 1367 would
apply to prevent double taxation of the CFC's earnings when they are
distributed as a dividend or the CFC's stock is sold.
7. Any losses flowing through from the CFC to the United States
shareholder would be limited to the extent of the United States share-
287. See id. at 993.
288. See id. at 989-92.
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holder's basis in the CFC's stock and the United States shareholder's ba-
sis in loans to the CFC.
8. Distributions from the CFC would be tax-free to the extent of the
United States shareholder's basis in the CFC's stock, and any excess
would be treated as gain from the sale of the CFC's stock.
9. The current law definitions of "United States shareholder" in sec-
tion 951(b) and "controlled foreign corporation" in section 957 would be
retained. The direct, indirect, and constructive ownership rules of sec-
tion 958 would also be retained, although some modification of the con-
structive ownership rules might be desirable (e.g., expanding the family
attribution rules to include attribution of stock from siblings).
10. To allow elimination of the indirect credit rules for United States
shareholders of foreign corporations that are not CFCs, a U.S. person
owning at least 10% of the voting power of a foreign corporation that is
not a CFC would be allowed to elect current inclusion treatment with
respect to the foreign corporation and obtain a direct credit for its pro
rata share of the foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation. Thus, if
no election were made, a 10-percent-or-more United States shareholder
of a foreign corporation that is not a CFC or passive foreign investment
company could continue to defer U.S. tax on the foreign corporation's
earnings, but the price of continued deferral would be no foreign tax
credit for any foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation. To prevent
self-selection problems, a United States shareholder's election with re-
spect to any particular foreign corporation would be revocable only with
the consent of the IRS.
11. With respect to a U.S. person owning stock (no matter how small
the ownership interest) in a foreign corporation that is not a CFC but that
earns primarily passive income, one anti-deferral regime would apply and
that regime would be patterned after the passive foreign investment com-
pany provisions of current law. However, to simplify those rules, current
inclusion of the passive foreign investment company's income could be
made mandatory. The complex rules relating to the interest charge on
excess distributions and the various elective rules in section 1291(d) of
current law could be repealed. 289
If the U.S. person owning shares in the passive foreign investment com-
pany does not have sufficient information to determine his/her/its pro
rata share of the passive foreign investment company's income, that U.S.
person could be allowed to base the amount of the current inclusion on
generally available financial information of the passive foreign invest-
ment company (as adjusted to reflect U.S. tax accounting principles for
certain "material items" that could be "reasonably identified" by the U.S.
person). 290 Alternatively, if the passive foreign investment company's
289. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3, at 223; Michael J. McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax
From U.S.-Resident Individuals and U.S.-Based MNEs on Income Earned Through Foreign
Entities, 11 TAX NOTES INT'L 440, 444-45 (1995).
290. See Shay, supra note 3, at 1061.
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stock is marketable stock, the U.S. person could be provided with a mar-
ket-to-market election similar to the one in section 1296 of current law.
In the event that the foreign corporation's stock is not marketable and
the U.S. person owning stock in the corporation does not possess suffi-
cient information to properly report under the pass-through method, our
modified version of the section 1291 "interest-charge" method for recap-
turing the benefits of deferral would be used here.291
This narrower version of the pass-through proposal would still have
many of the simplification benefits achieved by the broader version of the
anti-deferral proposal discussed above, including repeal of the detailed
Subpart F income definitional rules in sections 952 through 954, the indi-
rect credit provisions in sections 902 and 960, and the foreign personal
holding company and foreign investment company regimes. However,
this narrower version would lose some significant simplification benefits
of the broader anti-deferral proposal by retaining some of the definitional
complexities of the current law Subpart F and passive foreign investment
company regimes (e.g., the definitions of a controlled foreign corporation
in section 957 and a passive foreign investment company in a modified
version of section 1297).
This narrower version of the pass-through proposal also would be
much less effective in ending the deferral subsidy because it would gener-
ally continue to allow deferral of U.S. tax on active foreign business in-
come by U.S. persons owning less than a 10% stock interest in a CFC and
by U.S. persons owning stock in foreign corporations that are not CFCs
as defined in section 957. It also would continue to allow deferral of U.S.
tax on foreign passive income by U.S. persons owning stock in foreign
corporations that are neither CFCs nor passive foreign investment com-
panies. Thus, this narrower version would continue to place a premium
on tax planning maneuvers that structure the stock ownership of U.S.
persons in a foreign corporation in such a way as to avoid "United States
shareholder" status for the shareholder under section 951(b), "controlled
foreign corporation" status for the corporation under section 957, or
"passive foreign investment company" status for the corporation under
section 1297.
Finally, many of the problems with the broader version of the pass-
through proposal discussed above would apply to this narrower version as
well. However, this narrower version would avoid some of the potential
administrative difficulties with applying the pass-through regime to rela-
tively small stock interests of U.S. persons in foreign corporations, partic-
ularly non-U.S.-controlled foreign corporations.
291. See supra text accompanying note 277.
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F. ANOTHER NARROWER VERSION OF THE
PAss-THROUGH PROPOSAL
Yet another possible version of this anti-deferral proposal would apply
the pass-through regime to any U.S. person owning stock in a foreign
corporation that meets the definition of a CFC in section 957 (with per-
haps a broadening of that definition). This proposal would retain a modi-
fied version of the passive foreign investment company provisions
(similar to the one discussed above) to deal with abuses involving deferral
of passive income earned through foreign corporations that are not CFCs.
This narrower version of the anti-deferral proposal is preferable to the
broader version only if one accepts the underlying rationale of Subpart F
that deferral should be ended only with respect to U.S. shareholders who
have the power to force a dividend distribution (i.e., those U.S. persons
owning 10% or more of the voting stock of a foreign corporation that is
more than 50% owned by such shareholders).
X. TRANSITION ISSUES
A. EFFECT OF THE PAss-THROUGH PROPOSAL IN THE ABSENCE OF
TRANSITION RELIEF
If the pass-through proposal were adopted without transition relief,
presumably the rules governing a change in status from a corporation to a
partnership would apply. Under current law, the corporation would be
deemed to liquidate and the shareholders deemed to contribute the assets
to a partnership. 292 Assuming that the controlled foreign corporation
were owned directly by an 80% (by vote and value) domestic corporate
shareholder, the deemed liquidation would be a taxable disposition of the
CFC stock unless the shareholder elected to include the all earnings and
profits amount in income.293 If the shareholder were not a corporation or
owned less than 80% of the CFC stock by vote and value, the deemed
liquidation would be a taxable disposition of the CFC stock.294 Accord-
ingly, in the absence of statutory transition relief, shareholders in foreign
corporations deemed by the proposal to change to a pass-through entity
would recognize deferred earnings in a section 332 liquidation or all un-
realized gain in a taxable disposition. 295 The pass-through entity would
obtain a fair market value basis in the assets deemed contributed back to
292. See Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 71; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-003 (Jan. 17,
1996); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii) (1997).
293. See I.R.C. §§ 332, 337; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7.367(b)-5. If the domestic corporation
does not include the all earnings and profits amount, the foreign corporation will not be
considered a corporation for purposes of section 332 and the domestic corporation will be
taxable on the gain realized. The carryover rules for assets and corporate attributes (sec-
tions 334 and 381) will continue to apply.
294. See I.R.C. § 331.
295. Section 1248 would apply to a United States shareholder's taxable disposition of
CFC stock and recharacterize the gain as a dividend income to the extent of untaxed earn-
ings and profits accumulated during the period the shareholder was a United States share-
holder and the foreign corporation was a CFC.
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the pass-through entity, or, in the case of a section 332 liquidation, a car-
ryover basis.
The following discussion identifies and evaluates possible alternative
transition rules, ranging from the maximum windfall for taxpayers that
have untaxed deferred income to "no transition."
B. ALTERNATIVE TRANSITION RULES
Maximum transition relief. If the pass-through proposal were adopted,
the most generous transition for an 80% U.S. corporate shareholder
would be to permit the change in classification of the CFC to a pass-
through entity without requiring taxation of untaxed accumulated earn-
ings and allowing the pass-through entity to take a carryover basis in the
former CFC's assets. An analogous level of transition relief for a U.S.
shareholder other than an 80% corporate shareholder would be to pro-
vide exemption from tax on liquidation gain, exemption from Subpart F
or other U.S. income inclusion of entity-level gain, and carryover basis
for assets transferred. This would not only forgive tax on pre-change
earnings, but also give the U.S. taxpayer the benefit of tax basis in assets
that have been acquired with pre-tax dollars.296
There is precedent for such extreme generosity in transition. In 1984,
in order to persuade exporters to support a change from the domestic
international sales corporation (DISC) tax regime 297 to the foreign sales
corporation (FSC) regime,298 in the face of a challenge by several Euro-
pean trading partners that the DISC was an illegal export subsidy under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the deferred earn-
ings of a DISC were exempted from taxation.299 Arguments in support
of the DISC transition relief were not stated explicitly in the legislative
history, but implicitly included that the change in the targeted incentive
was being forced on exporters by the government's desire to comply with
the GATT and terminate a contentious trade dispute. In addition, the
FSC regime provided for an exemption system and exemption of the
DISC deferred earnings from tax avoided the need to maintain DISC
rules for earnings that would have continued to be deferred. Finally, the
argument was made that the deferred DISC earnings likely would never
have been taxed and, therefore, the transition relief was not as generous
as it appeared.
It is arguable, however, that the DISC history is not a controlling pre-
cedent regarding the elimination of deferral because unlike the DISC
provisions, deferral is not a targeted subsidy consciously intended by gov-
296. This policy issue was identified by Charles Kingson in connection with analyzing
the appropriate "toll charge" for an inbound corporate liquidation. See Charles 1. Kingson,
The Theory and Practice of Section 367, 37th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 22-1, 22-7 to 22-
30 (1979).
297. See I.R.C. §§ 991-997.
298. See I.R.C. §§ 921-927.
299. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 805(b)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 1001-02 (1984).
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ernment to induce reliance. 3o1 Arguably it is more like an advantageous
tax rate that can be raised without transition relief.
Minimum transition relief Although relief from all income recognition
(without basis adjustment) clearly is too generous a form of transition,
triggering realization of more than the amount of deferred earnings and
profits goes too far in the other direction. If, as discussed above, the
baseline objective is to move to current inclusion in income of previously
realized foreign corporate earnings, it would not seem appropriate to re-
quire realization of corporate-level unrealized appreciation (i.e., goodwill
and other assets). 30 1 Accordingly, a transition rule that did not compel
recognition of unrealized gains but that required inclusion of an all earn-
ings and profits amount and section 332 carryover treatment for assets in
what otherwise would be a section 331 liquidation case would seem ap-
propriate at a minimum.
Alternative transition proposals. It would be possible to fashion transi-
tion relief that falls between current inclusion of all untaxed earnings and
exemption of untaxed earnings. One approach would be to permit a tax-
payer to reduce basis in depreciable and certain other property, under
principles of section 1017, in lieu of current inclusion of pre-change earn-
ings. Another approach would be to spread inclusion of pre-change earn-
ings over multiple years in a manner similar to section 481 treatment of
accounting method changes.
The following discussion identifies the standards that might be em-
ployed to evaluate the preceding, and other, approaches to transition
relief.
C. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING CLAIMS FOR TRANSITION RELIEF
Transition relief in tax legislation is and always will be a political exer-
cise. Nonetheless, it is desirable to attempt to apply objective standards
in considering transition claims or face erosion in public respect for the
tax system if transition relief is perceived as an unprincipled pork-barrel
giveaway.302 Ronald Pearlman observes that transition relief may pertain
to pre- or post-change behavior.303 This discussion is addressed solely to
the effect of the proposal on pre-change actions. 304
300. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
301. It also would not be necessary to require realization of appreciation in PFIC stock
that has been the subject of a QEF election or that is subject to the PFIC interest charge or
mark-to-market rules.
302. See Ronald Pearlman, Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax, reprinted
in AM. B. Ass'N TAX SEC., A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TAX PROPOSALS
22 (1998). Pearlman cites the adverse publicity from the Philadelphia Inquirer's reporting
of the hundreds of transition rules included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Donald L.
Barlett & James B. Steele, A Historic Hotel and Its Quest for a Tax Cut, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIREY, Sept. 26, 1988 at A-10; Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Tax Break
Sweepstakes: Who Wins Round 2?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 25, 1988, at A-I.
303. See Pearlman, supra note 302, at 22-23.
304. The pass-through proposal may have a significant wealth effect on U.S. taxpayers
affected by the proposal. These effects may be addressed by ameliorating the transition to
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Reliance-based claims for relief Transition relief historically has not
been granted for rate changes, but is common in relation to tax base
changes that narrow or repeal taxpayer-favorable provisions of existing
law. A common basis for claiming transition relief is reliance. The reli-
ance claim essentially is that the government should not penalize taxpay-
ers who have been induced to undertake a specific action or investment
by a tax incentive provision. 305 The claim is strongest for targeted tax
incentive provisions.
There is an irony in assessing reliance claims in relation to the deferral
issue, namely, that most proponents of deferral insist that the location of
their investments is not tax-motivated. In such a circumstance, it could be
argued that transition relief is not appropriate for pre-change earnings. If
deferral is analyzed as an incentive, however, a reliance claim could be
asserted if taxpayers demonstrated that they invested abroad in reliance
on the incentive.
Moderating wealth effects. Not all commentators subscribe to the need
or desirability of reliance-based transition relief, rejecting the analogy to
a contractual relationship. 3116 Professor Michael Graetz would, however,
take account of the magnitude of wealth effects3°17 and there likely would
be substantial wealth effects from adoption of the pass-through proposal
since the value of CFC assets would be decreased. There also would be
windfall gain wealth effects if pre-change untaxed earnings were ex-
empted from taxation altogether.308
Mitigating inefficiencies of tax uncertainty. As noted above, it may be
argued that transition relief should depend on the magnitude of the
change proposed and take account of the effect of tax law change on the
risk premium for future investments. This argument for transition relief
is strongest for targeted incentives. Others argue, however, that transi-
tion relief may disturb rather than correct a properly functioning market
that takes risks of changes in the law into account.309
Evaluation. U.S. multinational corporations have billions of dollars of
untaxed, unrepatriated earnings. 3111 There is no accurate basis to gauge
the proposal through postponed effective dates or other measures. This Article does not
discuss this aspect of transition.
305. See Pearlman, supra note 302, at 24.
306. See Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1823-24(1985).
307. See id. at 1826.
308. Professor Graetz finds that neither fairness nor efficiency requires grandfathering
of pre-change transactions or investments. Generally, he would favor phased-in or delayed
effective dates. See id. For an argument, in response to Professor Graetz and others, thatgrandfathering is appropriate for incentive subsidy provisions, see Kyle D. Logue, Tax
Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitinent,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996).
309. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 520, 550-52 (1986).
310. Office of Management and Budget estimates of the revenue from eliminating the
deferral tax expenditure exceed $2 billion annually. See OFI'"CE OF MANAGEMENT &
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES-
FISCAL YEAR 1999 74 (1998).
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the amount of unrealized gain United States shareholders of CFCs and
other United States shareholders have in their holdings of foreign corpo-
rate stock. Without doubt, in the absence of transition relief, a pass-
through based anti-deferral proposal would constitute one of the largest
potential revenue raising measures available to an Administration or
Congress. 31' Any such proposal will be required to address claims by
these shareholders for relief from current taxation.
The unmitigated constructive liquidation model, explained above, for
determining the tax consequences of a change in classification from cor-
porate to pass-through status is not appropriate for the transition to any
of our proposed pass-through regimes because it would accelerate reali-
zation of appreciation in entity-level assets. If taxable U.S. shareholders
in a foreign corporation were not required to include pre-change earnings
in income, however, they would realize an unprecedented windfall if their
foreign corporations were placed in a pass-through regime which allowed
these corporations to continue with asset basis that represented untaxed
(by the United States) earnings and profits.31 2 There is no tax policy
merit to such a rule (that is not accomplished more efficiently by more
modest relief) except as an explicitly political cost of reform.
We do not know the amount of additional U.S. taxes that would be due
if undistributed pre-change earnings were included in income. If earnings
were distributed to a corporate taxpayer and carried significant foreign
tax credits, there may be no additional U.S. tax. It is likely, however, that
there would be substantial additional federal and state tax due. Accord-
ingly, we would favor a transition rule that permitted pre-change earnings
to be included in income over a period of from three to five years (but no
later than when transferred basis is utilized in the taxpayer's U.S. return).
XI. CONCLUSIONS
As this Article has demonstrated, design of an appropriate anti-defer-
ral regime for taxing the foreign source income earned by U.S. persons
through foreign corporations is an important and difficult issue in the in-
ternational tax arena. Although a number of different approaches have
been developed over the years and incorporated into U.S. law, dissatis-
faction with the current rules is widespread, regardless of one's views of
the appropriateness of the deferral privilege. We have concluded that the
most effective method for achieving anti-deferral is the pass-through
model-i.e., treating the foreign corporation as a pass-through entity with
311. Recent discussions of whether the repeal of deferral would raise or lose revenue
either have assumed that pre-enactment earnings would not be taxed or have not discussed
the issue. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 3; Oosterhuis & Cutrone, supra note 3. Professor
Saul Levmore has argued that unexpected use of retroactive taxation may provide a
nondistortionary source of revenue. See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 273-78 (1993).
312. We assume that tax-exempt entities would not be adversely affected by the ab-
sence of exemption of pre-change earnings because a distribution of corporate earnings in
liquidation would not give rise to unrelated business taxable income.
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respect to its U.S. shareholders, with special rules for less than 10%
shareholders in non-U.S.-controlled foreign corporations. Although this
pass-through proposal does have some problems (including difficult tran-
sition issues), it best satisfies the optimal criteria for designing an appro-
priate anti-deferral mechanism discussed in Part VI of the Article. By
writing this Article, we hope to provoke discussion and debate in the in-
ternational tax community concerning the anti-deferral issue and the ap-
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